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. As the United States moves into the next century one of the biggest threats facing her 
national interests is the proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Systems, with their 
potential for carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD). In order for the United States to 
"project power", the Navy must play a large role in the protection of friendly assets from TBM 
attacks. Thus, the Navy is continuing to develop new systems and technologies as it attempts to 
migrate older weapons systems to fulfill this mission into its initial ballistic missile defense 
concept, Navy Area Defense (NAD). This thesis looks at the differences between the current "as 
is" physical/information architectures for the Anti-Air Warfare Commander and the future "to 
be" physical/information architectures for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Commander. 
The conventional anti-air warfare and TBM defense information requirements, on an 
Aegis, are developed using IDEF 0 Diagrams. These information requirement differences must 
be used as drivers for future system acquisition and development. Also, the potential problem 
areas associated with adding TBMD as an additional responsibility for the Air Warfare 
Commander (A WC) onboard and AEGIS platform, are covered. 
The results of this thesis represent the initial plan (roadmap) for changes needed to 
support the evolving mission (Navy Area Defense) in the fleet. 
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With the fall of the Soviet Union and the collective protection her alliances provided, 
more nations now feel vulnerable to the will of self-appointed regional hegemonies. As the 
world enters the new century there is one weapon system whose cost, availability, and range of 
power make it the obvious choice for regional hegemonies, the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM). 
The resulting instability in turn creates a need for a weapon system that will ensure the 
vulnerable nations some strategic security and additional defensive capabilities. The 
proliferation of TBMs has quickly become a national security concern for the U.S. The fact that 
nations (who otherwise have disproportionate amounts of political, economic or military power) 
wish to engage in the acquisition of TBM systems is in itself a topic of many other studies. With 
the increasing availability of open source technical information their quest for more advanced 
offensive missile systems will only get easier. 
As the United States moves into the next century one of the biggest threats facing her 
national interests is the proliferation of Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) systems, with their 
potential for carrying Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In order for the United States to 
"project power", the Navy must play a large role in the protection of friendly assets from TBM 
attacks. Thus, the Navy is developing new systems and technologies as it attempts to migrate 
older weapons systems into its initial ballistic missile defense concept, Navy Area 
Defense(NAD). The United States must respond to the TBM threat and that response will 
inevitably be joint. In order to get an accurate picture of the Navy's role in the TBMD mission 
one must first understand the overall concept for joint missile defense. The Joint Staff has 
broken down the notion of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense into four components: 
xi 
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1. Attack Operations 
2. Passive Defense 
3. Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (BMC4I) 
4. Active Defense. 
The principal component discussed in this thesis is Active Defense, which is the primary 
role that the Aegis cruiser will play [while the Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Commander 
(TBMDC) is embarked.] This thesis looks at the differences between the current "as is" 
physical/information architectures for the Anti-Air Warfare Commander and the future "to be" 
physical/information architectures for Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Commander. 
The conventional anti-air warfare and TBM defense information requirements, on an 
Aegis, are developed using IDEF 0 Diagrams. These information requirement differences must 
be used as drivers for future system acquisition and development. Also, the potential problem 
areas associated with adding TBMD as an additional responsibility for the Air Warfare 
Commander (A WC) onboard an AEGIS platform, is covered. 
The results of this thesis represent the initial plan (roadmap) for changes needed to 
support the evolving mission (Navy Area Defense) of Aegis platforms in the fleet. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE THREAT 
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the collective protection her alliances provided, 
more nations now feel vulnerable to the will of self-appointed regional hegemonies. The 
resulting instability in turn creates a need for a weapon system that will ensure the vulnerable 
nations some strategic security and additional defensive capabilities. As the world enters the new 
century there is one weapon system whose cost, availability, and range of power make it the 
obvious choice for regional hegemonies, the Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM). The proliferation 
of this weapon system has quickly become a national security concern for the U.S. The fact that 
nations (who otherwise have disproportionate amounts of political, economic or military power) 
wish to engage in the acquisition of such systems is in itself a topic of many other studies. For 
the purposes of this paper the assumption is made that these nation's acquisition strategies are 
succeeding. With the increasing availability of open source technical information, their quest for 
more advanced missile systems will only get easier. 
There are over 20 countries, not currently in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), that have some ballistic missile capability, many of which are also in the process of 
acquiring some form of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) which can be delivered by TBMs. 
"By the end of this decade, as many as 10 developing countries could have nuclear weapons, and 
10 could possess a biological capability."[!] 
In Third-World missile systems, relatively poor accuracy creates the need for a more 
powerful warhead. "While First World land attack cruise missiles gain their leverage through 
stealth and accuracy derived from a system of systems, Third World Theater Ballistic Missiles 
stand alone, and must rely on speed and brute force."[2] Taking that need for a more powerful 
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warhead one step further, many of these countries are aggressively pursuing chemical, biological, 
and nuclear payloads for their less accurate missiles. This natural progression becomes an 
immediate threat when one considers the destructive power of these WMD. Chemical and 
biological weapons are much easier to produce, but the complete destructive power of a nuclear 
warhead makes it the ultimate prize for an up-and-coming regional power. Some evidence 
suggests that the Iraqis came close to attaining some nuclear weapons capability in 1991, and the 
Iranian program is not far behind. 
"The Iranian effort to acquire nuclear weapons technology mirrors the push by President 
Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear bomb in Iraq over the last 15 years. The Iranians use many of 
the old Iraqi smuggling routes and contacts ... "[3] The Theater Ballistic Missile with weapons of 
mass destruction give them an additional ability to affect international politics. 
There is little doubt that the Israeli government would have become an active participant 
in the Persian Gulf War had the conventional SCUDs fired at them by Iraq contained a WMD. 
Those missiles affected many decisions, political as well as military, during that war. The 
proliferation of the TBMs combined with WMD payloads has brought the Ballistic Missile 
Defense Organization (BMDO) ~d its effort to produce an effective defense against those 
systems into the spotlight. "In an era of reduced U.S. overseas presence, the first American 
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense capability on the scene of a developing crisis is likely to come 
from the sea--but it will be. enabled, supported and eventually reinforced by the complementary 
capabilities of all branches, and possibly bolstered by the synergistic contributions of allies and 
coalition partners." [ 4] 
This thesis will discuss some of the general concepts of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense 
(TBMD), focusing specifically on the physical and information architectures being developed 
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for the Navy's role in the Active Defense element of the TBMD solution. In addition a brief 
discussion of operational considerations and areas of potential improvement will be covered. 
B. FOUR ELEMENTS OF THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
The United States must respond to the threat described above, and that response will 
inevitably be joint. In order to get an accurate picture of the Navy's role in the TBMD mission 
one must first understand the overall concept for joint missile defense. The Joint Staff has 
broken down the notion of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense into four components: 
1. Attack Operations 
2. Passive Defense 
3. Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers and Intelligence (BMC41) 
4. Active Defense. 
1. Attack Operations 
Attack Operations are those whose primary mission is to destroy TBM launch platforms 
and their supporting elements, to include logistic infrastructure, BM C3 nodes, and their targeting 
and surveillance systems. The key tenet of Attack Operations is that attacking forces attempt to 
destroy the missiles and any WMDs on the ground. If these operations are successful they are 
certainly the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) preferred method of eliminating the TBM threat. 
This element also presents the greatest challenge to the TBMD planner. During a recent 
ROVING SANDS 95 Joint Tactical Air Operations Exercise, "even with special operations 
forces and a Pioneer unmanned aerial vehicle dedicated to locating [an] SS-21 battery, it 
successfully fired all missiles--many with [simulated] chemical warheads--against some 20 corps 
and division targets."[5] Some of the defining characteristics of TBMD Attack Operations are: 
3 
1. The inherent danger to attack aircraft while over enemy territory 
due to the additional proliferation of highly advanced Surface to Air 
Missiles. 
2. The more restrictive ROE that will be applied to the operations 
taking place over foreign soil. 
3. A data transfer system that will get the needed targeting data to 
the shooter in a timely manner. 
2. Passive Defense 
Passive Defense is any actions taken to lessen the effects of damage caused by an 
enemy's ballistic missile attack. Those actions include minimizing an enemy's ability to target 
friendly assets, reducing the vulnerability of those assets, and steps taken to improve survival of 
those assets. Those assets are not necessarily military equipment and personnel, civilian 
population centers are also included. The way in which the Joint Force Commander (JFC) 
responds to the need for protection of those allied population centers can greatly enhance his 
military coalition building efforts. The theater Commander in Chief will certainly include the 
major population center on his Defended Assets List (DAL). The J-36 CONOPS states, "It is 
critical to plan for and disseminate TM [Theater Missile] launch warning and impact area 
prediction to civil authorities, as well as coalition forces .... The theater CINC and his 
subordinates should consider assisting the host nation civil authorities in establishing passive 
defense measures for the civilian population."[6] Our national assets currently have the 
capability to detect a TBM launch, but getting that information to the population centers for 
· distribution is the major challenge. One of the defining characteristics of TBMD Passive 
Defense is the importance of Intelligence and Early Warning. "The specific capabilities of the 
threat must be well understood in order to plan effective Passive Defense measures. 
Implementation of those measures in a timely manner (and with a minimum of false alerts) 
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requires effective Early Warning."[?] Political realities will force military commanders to 
defend the civilian population centers vice applying their full TBMD capabilities to protecting 
their own force . 
3. Battle Management C41 
Battle Management C41 is not just another pillar on which the TBMD strategy rests, it is 
the base on which the three operational pillars get their foundation. BMC41 is an operational 
system of systems that integrates the physical systems with the doctrinal concepts, organizational 
structures, and operational procedures in an attempt to develop a level of synergism that was 
previously unachievable. According to Joint Pub 3-01.5, "the threat cannot currently be 
c<:mntered by any single technical solution, nor will it likely be in the future. This threat can only 
be countered by the synergistic performance achieved by coordination and integrating all four 
operational elements into cohesive and coherent combat operations."[8] The BMC41 systems 
will provide the channel for the vital launch warning data dissemination, and will allow 
coordination of the TBMD battle. It will include Intelligence Preparation of the Battles pace 
(IPB), much of the joint planning information required to conduct TBMD operations, force 
orders, and interceptor kill assessment and Battle Damage Assessment of the DAL following 
TBM attack. While serving as the link among the other three elements, BMCI must help create 
a truly integrated system of systems and give the JFC the flexibility to respond to the threat. 
4. Active Defense 
Active Defense is any operation that attempts to destroy the cruise missile or the TBM 
itself while in flight. One major air threat to friendly forces in theater in the past has been the air 
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launched cruise missile (ALCM). Our principal tactic for defending against the ALCM is to 
attack the aircraft before it reaches its weapons release point, thus·eliminating the easier of the 
two potential AA W targets. With the proliferation of the TBM there is no longer the opportunity 
for our air defense forces to shoot the "archer"; our TBMD assets must have the capability to 
shoot down the arrows. "Planning for TBMD Active Defense attempts to compensate for the 
challenging nature of the target by working to achieve defense in depth--early sensor cueing, 
followed by multiple shot opportunities for complementary interceptor systems throughout the 
course of an inbound missile's flight."[9] Responsibility for this mission will normally be 
assigned by the Joint Force Commander to an Area Air Defense Commander (AADC). They 
will set the priorities for defense and appropriation of the JFC' s assets. Those assets may be 
transferred to the operational control of the AADC for defensive planning and will then operate 
under the Rules of Engagement for the Active Defense forces. Characteristics of active defense 
include: 
1. The advanced notification of any information concerning the 
type of warhead on the TBM 
2. The need for the earliest possible alert of TBM preparation and 
launch, to enable a rapid netted cueing of Active Defense sensors 
and systems 
3. A highly organized coordination between the different element of 
the layered defense 
4. The ability to select the correct weapon and establish strict fire 
discipline for a given threat, in order to save the TBMD assets. 
This thesis will discuss Active Defense and Command and Control issues. The detection, 
tracking, and interception of Theater Ballistic Missiles in flight is the crux of the Navy's role in 
the Active Defense element of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense. Specifically, this thesis will 
define what information is needed to consummate an engagement and how that information will 
reach a given shooter in a joint environment. The Navy in 2005 plans to have a multi-tiered 
6 
TBMD system with Navy Area Defense (NAD) as the lower tier element and Navy Theater Wide 
defense (NTW) as the upper tier defense. The SM2 Block IV missile will be the interceptor for 
the NAD system and the NTW will rely on the SM2/LEAP variant. The use of these two systems 
will give the theater CINC flexible defensive coverage from a ground level point defense system 
to an extended range of over 100 km. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
The Naval Area Defense (NAD) and Navy Theater Wide Defense (TWD) will be the 
significant new capability that the Navy will bring into the joint arena in the future. This thesis 
will discuss only the first of the two systems to come on line, the NAD. This new system will 
have a significant political, as well as military, impact. For the purpose of this thesis it will be 
assumed that all of the developing Command and Control systems discussed will be operational 
and employed. The time frame for the thesis in the "to be" domain will be circa 2005. The 
second chapter will attempt to demonstrate the differences between the AA WC' s current physical 
architecture and the Ballistic Missile Defense Commander's (BMDC's) future physical 
architecture. Both commanders will be embarked on an Aegis cruiser. The third chapter will 
attempt to describe the differences in information exchange requirements for the two 
commanders. The last chapter will combine and summarize the changes and will discuss some 
of the potential problem areas during this evolution. Because the Aegis cruiser is the only 
TBMD player that is truly multi-mission capable, i.e., AA W, USW, ASW, etc., there are 
problems that may occur with the systems that are seemingly not related to TBMD. 
7 
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II. PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURES 
This chapter will describe the differences between the current AAWC physical 
architecture and the "to be" physical architecture that will be used during the Navy's TBM active 
defense mission using NAD. The "as is" architecture will provide the bases on which the "to 
be" physical Information Architecture will be built. When performing AA W operations the Anti-
Air Warfare Commander will reside on an Aegis cruiser or destroyer, therefore the architecture 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 represents a generic Aegis cruiser/destroyer. 
A. "AS IS" PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
The key nodes providing Command and Control (C2) systems and communications 
services which comprise this "as is" architecture are described below in the numbered order 
shown on Figure 1. 
1. Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange system (OTCIXS) 
OTCIXS interfaces with JMCIS and the AEGIS Weapon System (A WS) to provide a 
secure computer-to-computer tactical information network among surface combatants. The 
network operates on 1.2 or 2.4 KHz channels over UHF SATCOM using USMTF and OTH-T 
Gold message formats. 
2. Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) 
The OPINTEL system provides data on one-way (shore-to-ship) FLTSATCOM channels 
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3. Tactical Data Information Exchange System A (TADIXS A) 
TADIXS A is a satellite broadcast one-way, shore-to-ship communications link serving as 
a worldwide network for disseminating near real-time OTH-T data and the Ocean Surveillance 
Products (OSP) from designated shore sites to flag-capable and Tomahawk-equipped platforms, 
in OTH-T GOLD format. The TADIXS Gateway Processors at each NCTAMS provide both the 
shore hub of the TADIXS, and the NCTAMS transfers information between OTCIXS networks. 
4. Link-11 (TADIL A) 
Link-11 using T ADIL A message formats is a secure, computer-to-computer network of 
digital links which allows ships, aircraft and ground stations to share tactical data, primarily track 
data. TADIL A messages currently are used by USMC and USAF systems and certain NATO 
allies in addition to the Navy to exchange surveillance data (air, surface, and subsurface); 
Electronic Warfare (EW) and intelligence, aircraft control and status; weapon control and status; 
command management; and training. The Navy will be modifying the standards and protocols 
over the next several years to support TMD. 
5. The Tactical Related Application (TRAP) Data Dissemination System (TDDS) 
A principal means of disseminating TBM launch alert and cueing information to users is 
the TDDS. The Defense Support Program (DSP) sensors downlink the unprocessed sensor data 
to the Tactical Event System (TES) which develops the target information and distributes it by 
TDDS. 
TDDS is composed of a worldwide network of ground sites which interface with sensor 
systems and satellite transponders via a UHF network and a Terrestrial Communications 
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Network (TCN). Over the UHF network, single sites transmit and receive from one satellite. 
Dual sites transmit and receive from two satellites. The dual sites store and forward data from 
one satellite to the other. Over the TCN, high speed communications circuits are used for 
interground site communications. Among the messages which TDDS processes are generic 
tactical contact reports in USMTF-SENSOREP format as described in JointPUB 6-04. TDDS 
transforms them into message type 7 (generic on-the-air format) for transmission via the satellite. 
6. Fleet Satellite Broadcast System (FSBS) 
The Fleet Satellite Broadcast System transmits 15 sub-channels of encrypted message 
traffic at an input data rate of 75 bps per channel. These sub-channels are time-division 
~ultiplexed in a one-way RF transmission at 1200 bps. The shore-based terminal transmits these 
data on a direct sequence spread-spectrum SHF signal to UHF satellites, where the signal is 
translated to UHF and down-linked. Message traffic is queued and/or channel selected prior to 
transmission by two processor-controlled message switching systems: 
1. The Naval Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) 
for general-service message traffic. 
2. STREAMLINER for special-intelligence message traffic. 
General service message traffic can be read into the NA VCOMP ARS processor from 
facilities at the NCT AMS/NCTS or can automatically be read from an Automatic Digital 
Information Network (AUTODIN) switching center. In general, the same process is applicable 
for entering special-intelligence messages via STREAMLINER. 
The High Speed Fleet Broadcast (HSFB) Program will upgrade the Fleet Broadcast 
System (PBS) transmission subsystem by improving broadcast transmission speed, information 
throughput, and resource flexibility. The HSFB upgrade offers the capability to reallocate 
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available information throughput capacity among users in response to changing tactical 
environments and the ability to handle traffic quantity and quality demands imposed by high 
speed automated subsystems. Identical reconfigurable time division multiplexers (TDMs) 
replace satellite broadcast multiplexers ashore and afloat. The AN/SSR-lA satellite broadcast 
receiver (modified) accommodates coded data rates up to 19.2K bps. 
7. Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS B) 
TADIXS B is a UHF broadcast designed to deliver targeting quality contact data to 
tactical users of all services. Contact data consists of contact type, identification, location, time 
and amplifying data of selected air, sea and land contacts. It supports the I&W, surveillance, and 
targeting data requirements of operational decision makers and targeteers in all warfare areas. 
8. Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) 
Tactical Receive Equipment receives, decodes, processes and distributes on a FIFO basis 
TDDS and TADIX B transmissions at various world wide fixed and mobile receiving sites and 
provides an automated interface for users' Tactical Data Processors in several information 
formats as shown below. After screening for duplicates, messages are filtered, formatted and 
transferred based on parameters specified by users' data processors (e.g., JMCIS). 
9. Tactical Intelligence (TACINTEL) 
T ACINTEL is a computer-based message processing system providing automatic receipt 
and transmission of Special Intelligence (SI) for shore and afloat users. T ACINTEL subscribers 
may participate in up to six RF nets with automatic message routing, on a priority basis, among 
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nets. Transmission control is achieved using a computerized polling scheme. A net control 
function specifies to each subscriber a sequence order list which gives the order and time 
allocation for a transmission. Subscribers access the net during a random access time slot at the 
end of each net transmission cycle. A portion of a DAMA 25 kHz channel has been allocated to 
T ACINTEL, and baseband interfaces can be configured automatically for using different 
communication media, including UHF LOS, UHF SATCOM, SHF SATCOM, EHF SATCOM 
andHF. 
10. Combat Cryptologic Support System (CCSS) and Combat Direction Finding 
(DF) System 
cess is a cryptologic sensor management, coordination and tasking system installed 
aboard AEGIS cruisers and functioning as a passive surveillance sensor and as an extension of 
the C2 system. CCSS provides continuous all weather, day-and-night, near-real time response to 
command. It provides target acquisition, combat surveillance, early warning, threat warning and 
special intelligence information. It supplements and complements existing ship's sensors. It is 
primarily designed to support the AA WC. 
Combat DF is an automated electronic warfare system installed aboard DDG-51 class 
ships which provides tactical cryptologic support through the exploitation of hostile 
communications. Combat DF automatically intercepts and localizes communication signals, and 
uses cryptologic techniques to locate, identify and track targets over the horizon. It disseminates 
tactical cryptologic data and target information to: 
1. own ship decision makers 
2. force combat and command support systems 
3. shore support sites. 
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11. Command and Control Processor (C2P) 
The c2p provides translation interfaces between incompatible information processing 
systems, such as T ADILs A, C, and J. It accepts data from other platform systems, formats it in 
accordance with the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems 
(JINTACCS) message standards for the designated link, and sends it to communication devices 
for transmission to the user. On AEGIS ships the c2p provides for data exchange between Link 
11, Link 4A and AEGIS C&D. 
12. Link-4A 
The Link-4A system provides digital data link communications between controlled 
aircraft and a controlling Combat Direction System (CDS) station. The application of Link-4A 
to AAW is in its ability to transmit target detection, identification and track data from airborne, 
ship-based or ground-based sensors to the appropriate weapons control systems, and to provide a 
means of relaying such data among a community of users. The system is capable of one or two 
way communication in the UHF frequency band. It provides an omni-directional asynchronous 
signal, unencrypted, with a+ or- 20 kHz FSK modulation. A time division multiplex, discrete 
address system sequentially directs messages to individually addressed subscribers. 
13. Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) 
JMCIS supports ships, commands, and navy command centers ashore, including specific 
segments for FLEET CINC and JFC/AADC (Afloat). Its primary functions include: 
1. collaborative mission planning 
2. force coordination 
3. developing, maintaining and disseminating a near real time common tactical picture 
including TMD launch alerts and missile engagements. 
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14. AEGIS Weapon System (A WS) 
The AEGIS Weapon System provides a fully integrated multi-mission system capability 
comprised of sensors, displays and weapon fire control. The A WS elements are further described 
in the following sub-sections. 
15. AEGIS Command and Decision (C&D) MK 2 
C&D is a computer and display system designed to manage and direct non-weapon 
systems functions for the combat systems aboard AEGIS cruisers and AEGIS destroyers. C & D 
consists of equipment, computer software and personnel. It is the central facility for monitoring 
the overall air, surface and subsurface tactical environment and serves as the repository for 
tracks. Organic and nonorganic tracks are correlated and decorrelated as well as purged. In 
addition, tracks are sent to ownship weapons systems and sensors. 
C&D supports the dissemination of force and ownship sensor data including appropriate 
alerts and orders. C&D is designed to facilitate efficient use of force and ownship weapons 
systems. C&D allows operator entry of doctrine statements which control the combat system 
mission. In general, C&D provides for operator entry, review, modification, activation, 
deactivation and/or deletion of doctrine statements and information. 
16. AEGIS Display System (ADS) MK 2 
ADS is a manned, computer-driven display system that provides support to both high-
level shipboard decision making (by ownship personnel with force-level warfare area command 
responsibilities) and by an embarked commander. ADS provides decision support and decision 
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execution support. ADS receives its data from C&D and displays the information on the 
following: 
1. large screen displays 
2. automated status boards that provide summaries of readiness, status and tactical 
data 
3. interactive stations that provide geographic and alphanumeric displays for the 
commanders, their TAOs, and console operators. 
ADS supports the dissemination or orders resulting from the decision process. 
C&D information transfers to ADS include the system and force track files, status 
information on systems and operations, and the AEGIS system doctrine that is currently in effect. 
17. SPY-1 Radar 
The SPY -1 radar provides the AEGIS Weapon System (A WS) with an integrated 
shipboard three dimensional S-band sensor system supporting both the Command and Decision 
and the Weapons Control functions of AWS. 
18. Weapons Control System (WCS) MK-8 
The WCS MK-8 translates weapon engagement orders and related assignments from 
C&D into commands for the control and management of Standard Missiles (SM-2) and other 
combat systems weapons. The WCS provides interference coordination between Phalanx, SM-2, 
ASROC, Tomahawk, Harpoon and the five inch gun mount. The WCS: 
1. computes threat engagability for weapon assignment and schedules, 
2. controls and monitors engagements 
3. carries out kill assessments 
4. provides timing data for the combat system. 
Using the SPY-1 target and missile track data the WCS: 
1. generates SM-2 missile initialization data 
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2. controls missile firing via the VLS 
3. generates midcourse guidance commands and forwards them via the SPY-1. 
At the appropriate time, WCS assigns a fire control director to illuminate the target during the 
missile terminal homing phase. The WCS also has a significant air control capability through the 
Link-4A interface. 
19. Vertical Launch System (VLS) MK-41 
The VLS MK-41 provides the housing and the launch mechanism for the repertoire of 
missiles carried aboard AEGIS cruisers and destroyers. 
20. Secure Voice (SECVOX) 
The Navy has SECVOX capabilities to support TBMD C2 encrypted communications 
between and within echelons of the TBMD command structure. The Advance Narrowband 
Digital Voice Terminal provides a common (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps) protocol 
for 3kHz half duplex transmit/receive encrypted voice communications among tactical air, 
surface and shore units via: 
1. line of site UHF 
2. beyond line-of-site HF or UHF aircraft relay channels 
3. WSC-3 Fleet SATCOM UHF channels. 
Netted secure voice capability via UHF SATCOM will be available with the introduction of the 
TD-1271 BIU and USC-42(V)3 DAMA multiplexers. The Navy also uses the 16 kbps TRI-TAC 
digital secure voice mode, providing interoperability with the other services. 
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B. "TO BE" PHYSICAL ARCHITECTURE 
This "To Be" AA WC Physical Information Architecture aboard AEGIS ships in the 
2000-2002 time period supports the Navy's Area Defense (NAD). Key Command and Control 
(C2) systems and communications services which comprise this architecture are described below 
in the numbered order shown on Figure 2. 
1. Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange system (OTCIXS) 
OTCIXS interfaces with JMCIS and the AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) to provide a 
secure computer-to-computer tactical information network among surface combatants. The 
network operates on 1.2 or 2.4 KHz channels over UHF SATCOM using USMTF and OTH-T 
Gold message formats. 
2. Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) 
The OPINTEL system provides data on one-way (shore-to-ship) FLTSATCOM channels 
that provides Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) to afloat units. 
3. Tactical Data Information Exchange System A (TADIXS A) 
TADIXS A is a satellite broadcast one-way, shore-to-ship communications link serving as 
a world wide network for disseminating near real-time OTH-T data and the Ocean Surveillance 
Products (OSP) from designated shore sites to flag-capable and Tomahawk-equipped platforms, 
in OTH-T GOLD format. The T ADIXS Gateway Processors at each NCT AMS provide both the 
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4. Link-11 (TADIL A) 
Link-11 using TADIL A message formats is a secure, computer-to-computer network of 
digital links which allows ships, aircraft and ground stations to share tactical data, primarily track 
data. TADIL A messages currently are used by USMC and USAF systems and certain NATO 
allies in addition to the Navy to exchange surveillance data (air, surface, and subsurface); 
Electronic Warfare (EW) and intelligence, aircraft control and status; weapon control and status; 
command management; and training. The Navy will be modifying the standards and protocols 
over the next several years to support TMD. 
5. The Tactical Related Application (TRAP) Data Dissemination System (TDDS) 
A principal means of disseminating TBM launch alert and cueing information to users is 
the TDDS. The Defense Support Program (DSP) sensors downlink the unprocessed sensor data 
to the Tactical Event System (TES) which develops the target information and distributes it by 
TDDS. 
TDDS is composed of a worldwide network of ground sites which interface with sensor 
systems and satellite transponders via a UHF network and a Terrestrial Communications 
Network (TCN). Over the UHF network, single sites transmit and receive from one satellite. 
Dual sites transmit and receive from two satellites. The dual sites store and forward data from 
one satellite to the other. Over the TCN, high speed communications circuits are used for 
interground site communications. Among the messages which TDDS processes are generic 
tactical contact reports in USMTF-SENSOREP format as described in Joint PUB 6-04. TDDS 
transforms them into message type 7 (generic on-the-air format) for transmission via the satellite. 
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6. Fleet Satellite Broadcast System (FSBS) 
The Fleet Satellite Broadcast System transmits 15 sub-channels of encrypted message 
traffic at an input data rate of 75 bps per channel. These sub-channels are time-division 
multiplexed in a one-way RF transmission at 1200 bps. The shore-based terminal transmits these 
data on a direct sequence spread-spectrum SHF signal to UHF satellites, where the signal is 
translated to UHF and down-linked. Message traffic is queued and/or channel selected prior to 
transmission by two processor-controlled message switching systems: 
1. The Naval Communications Processing and Routing System (NAVCOMPARS) 
for general-service message traffic 
2. STREAMLINER for special-intelligence message traffic. 
General service message traffic can be read into the NAVCOMPARS processor from 
facilities at the NCTAMS/NCTS or can automatically be read from an Automatic Digital 
Information Network (AUTODIN) switching center. In general, the same process is applicable 
for entering special-intelligence messages via STREAMLINER. 
The High Speed Fleet Broadcast (HSFB) Program will upgrade the Fleet Broadcast 
System (FBS) transmission subsystem by improving broadcast transmission speed, information 
throughput, and resource flexibility. The HSFB upgrade offers the capability reallocate available 
information throughput capacity among users in response to changing tactical environments and 
the ability to handle traffic quantity and quality demands imposed by high speed automated 
subsystems. Identical reconfigurable time division multiplexers (TDMs) replace satellite 
broadcast multiplexers ashore and afloat. The AN/SSR-1A satellite broadcast receiver 
(modified) accommodates coded data rates up to 19.2Kbps. 
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7. Tactical Data Information Exchange System (TADIXS B) 
T ADIXS B is a UHF broadcast designed to deliver targeting quality contact data to 
tactical users of all services. Contact data consists of contact type, identification, location, time 
and amplifying data of selected air, sea and land contacts. It supports the I&W, surveillance, and 
targeting data requirements of operational decision makers and targeteers in all warfare areas. 
8. Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) 
Tactical Receive Equipment receives, decodes, processes and distributes on an FIFO 
basis TDDS and T ADIX B transmissions at various worldwide fixed and mobile receiving sites 
and provides an automated interface for users' Tactical Data Processors in several information 
formats as shown below. After screening for duplicates, messages are filtered, formatted and 
transferred based on parameters specified by users' data processors (e.g., JMCIS). 
9. Tactical Intelligence (TACINTEL) 
TACINTEL is a computer-based message processing system providing automatic receipt 
and transmission of Special Intelligence (SI) for shore and afloat users. T ACINTEL subscribers 
may participate in up to six RF nets with automatic message routing, on a priority basis, among 
nets. Transmission control is achieved using a computerized polling scheme. A net control 
function specifies to each subscriber a sequence order list which gives the order and time 
allocation for a transmission. Subscribers access the net during a random access time slot at the 
end of each net transmission cycle. A portion of a DAMA 25kHz channel has been allocated to 
T ACINTEL, and baseband interfaces can be configured automatically for using different 
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communication media, including UHF LOS, UHF SATCOM, SHF SATCOM, EHF SATCOM 
andHF. 
10. Combat Cryptologic Support System (CCSS) and Combat Direction Finding 
(DF) System 
cess is a cryptologic sensor management, coordination and tasking system installed 
aboard AEGIS cruisers and functioning as a passive surveillance sensor and as an extension of 
the C2 system. CCSS provides continuous all weather, day-and-night, near-real time response to 
command. It provides target acquisition, combat surveillance, early warning, threat warning and 
special intelligence information. It supplements and complements existing ship's sensors. It is 
primarily designed to support the AA WC. 
Combat DF is an automated electronic warfare system installed aboard DDG-51 class 
ships which provides tactical cryptologic support through the exploitation of hostile 
communications. Combat DF automatically intercepts and localizes communication signals, and 
uses cryptologic techniques to locate, identify and track targets over the horizon. It disseminates 
tactical cryptologic data and target information to: 
1. own ship decision makers 
2. force combat and command support systems 
3. shore support sites. 
11. Command and Control Processor (C2P) 
The c2p provides translation interfaces between incompatible current and planned 
information processing systems, such as TADILs A, C, and J. It accepts data from other platform 
systems, formats it in accordance with the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and 
Control Systems (JINT ACCS) message standards for the designated link, and sends it to 
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communication devices for transmission to the designated recipients. c2p accepts incoming data 
link messages, determines the platform systems that are to receive the data, reformats it to the 
formats expected by the receiving systems, and routes it. On AEGIS ships the c2p provides for 
data exchange between Link 11 and the AEGIS C&D suite. 
12. Link-4A 
The Link-4A system provides digital data link communications between controlled 
aircraft and a controlling Combat Direction System (CDS) station. The application of Link-4A 
to AA W is in its ability to transmit target detection, identification and track data from airborne, 
ship-based or ground-based sensors to the appropriate weapons control systems, and to provide a 
means of relaying such data among a community of users. The system is capable of one or two 
way communication in the UHF frequency band. It provides an omni-directional asynchronous 
signal, unencrypted, with a+ or- 20 kHz FSK modulation. A time division multiplex, discrete 
address system sequentially directs messages to individually addressed subscribers. 
13. Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) 
JMCIS supports ships, commands, and navy command centers ashore, including specific 
segments for FLEET CINC and JFC/AADC (Afloat). Its primary functions include: 
1. collaborative mission planning 
2. force coordination 
3. developing, maintaining and disseminating a near real time common tactical picture 
including TMD launch alerts and missile engagements. 
14. AEGIS Weapon System (A WS) 
The AEGIS Weapon System provides a fully integrated multi-mission system capability 
comprised of sensors, displays and weapon fire control. The A WS elements are further described 
in the following sub-sections. 
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15. AEGIS Command and Decision (C&D) MK 2 
C&D is a computer and display system designed to manage and direct non-weapon 
systems functions for the combat systems· aboard AEGIS cruisers and AEGIS destroyers. C & D 
consists of equipment, computer software and personnel. It is the central facility for monitoring 
the overall air, surface and subsurface tactical environment and serves as the repository for 
tracks. Organic and nonorganic tracks are correlated and decorrelated as well as purged. In 
addition, tracks are sent to ownship weapons systems and sensors. 
C&D supports the dissemination of force and ownship sensor data including appropriate 
alerts and orders. C&D is designed to facilitate efficient use of force and ownship weapons 
systems. C&D allows operator entry of doctrine statements which control the combat system 
mission. In general, C&D provides for operator entry, review, modification, activation, 
deactivation and/or deletion of doctrine statements and information. 
16. AEGIS Display System (ADS) MK 2 
ADS is a manned, computer-driven display system that provides support to both high-
level shipboard decision making (by ownship personnel with force-level warfare area command 
responsibilities) and by an embarked commander. ADS provides decision support and decision 
execution support. ADS receives its data from C&D and displays the information on the 
following: 
1. large screen displays 
2. automated status boards that provide summaries of readiness, status and tactical 
data 
3. interactive stations that provide geographic and alphanumeric displays for the 
commanders, their TAOs, and console operators. 
ADS supports the dissemination or orders resulting from the decision process. 
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C&D information transfers to ADS include the system and force track files, status 
information on systems and operations, and the AEGIS system doctrine that is currently in effect. 
17. SPY-1 Radar 
The SPY-I radar provides the AEGIS Weapon System (AWS) with an integrated 
shipboard three dimensional S-hand sensor system supporting both the Command and Decision 
and the Weapons Control functions of A WS. 
18. Weapons Control System (WCS) MK-8 
The WCS MK-8 translates weapon engagement orders and related assignments from 
C&D into commands for the control and management of Standard Missiles (SM-2) and other 
combat systems weapons. The WCS provides interference coordination between Phalanx, SM-2, 
ASROC, Tomahawk, Harpoon and the five inch gun mount. The WCS: 
1. computes threat engagability for weapon assignment and schedules, 
2. controls and monitors engagements 
3. carries out kill assessments 
4. provides timing data for the combat system. 
Using the SPY-I target and missile track data the WCS: 
1. generates SM-2 missile initialization data 
2. controls missile firing via the VLS 
3. generates midcourse guidance commands and forwards them via the SPY-1. 
At the appropriate time, WCS assigns a fire control director to illuminate the target during the 
missile terminal homing phase. The WCS also has a significant air control capability through the 
Link-4A interface. 
27 
19. Vertical Launch System (VLS) MK-41 
The VLS MK -41 provides the housing and the launch mechanism for the repertoire of 
missiles carried aboard AEGIS cruisers and destroyers. 
20. Secure Voice (SECVOX) 
The Navy has SECVOX capabilities to support TBMD C2 encrypted communications 
between and within echelons of the TBMD command structure. The Advance Narrowband 
Digital Voice Terminal provides a common (Air Force, Army, Navy and Marine Corps) protocol 
for 3 kHz half duplex transmit/receive encrypted voice communications among tactical air, 
surface and shore units via: 
1. line of site UHF 
2. beyond line-of-site HF or UHF aircraft relay channels 
3. WSC-3 Fleet SATCOM UHF channels. 
Netted secure voice capability via UHF SATCOM will be available with the introduction of the 
TD-1271 B/U and USC-42(V)3 DAMA multiplexors. The Navy also uses the 16 kbps TRI-TAC 
digital secure voice mode, providing interoperability with the other services. 
21. Link-16 - New 
Link-16 will become an important netted data link between most TMD platforms, other 
forces and allies by 2002. Link 16 provides increased throughput, security, jam resistance, 
location accuracy and interoperability. Link-16 is the U.S. Naval/North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) designation for netted links which allow the exchange of tactical 
information among ships and aircraft using digital formats, protocols, and standards set forth in 
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Navy Operational Specification 516, and NATO STANAG 5516. In joint service terminology, 
Link-16 is synonymous with TADIL J. 
Link-16ffADIL J is part of a joint service system known as the JTIDS. JTIDS is 
interoperable with USN, USAF, USA, United Kingdom, France and NATO terminals. NATO 
and certain aircraft will use what is known as the MIDS terminal, the Multi-Functional 
Information Distribution System, functionally identical to the U.S. JTIDS Class 2 terminal. 
JTIDS is a time division multiple access, jam-resistant digital data and voice 
communications system operating in the 960-1215 Mhz frequency range. Messages on JTIDS 
can be broadcast or addressed to a specific location. Users listen to all broadcast time slots and 
select what is of interest. A series of time slots is used as virtual circuits between specific users. 
There are three modes by which users can access a net: 
1. Dedicated (preassigned) 
2. Contention 
3. Time Slot Reallocation (TSR). 
There are also two relaying modes: 
1. Paired Slot 
2. Repromulgation. 
The TSR mode allows rapid access to JTIDS nets users. In this mode, there is a pool of 
time slots available which are available without a predetermined, preassigned plan. Subscribers 
use T ADIL J "announcement" messages to enter a net. Entry can occur for each subscriber as 
rapidly as every 6 seconds. 
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22. Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TWCS) 
TWCS is an element of the Tomahawk Weapons System. TWCS provides shipboard computer-
assisted processing and control of targeting, engagement planning and launch control of the 
Tomahawk missile. To accomplish this, TWCS correlates and tracks surface and air contact 
reports received from several interfacing systems. 
The theater ocean surveillance data base maintained by TWCS provides targeting 
information for Tomahawk weapon employment. TWCS targets may be received from either on-
board or off-board command systems. TWCS can maintain a common force-level track data 
base, disseminate the force track data base, and issue ASUW engagement orders to designated 
TWCS platforms via OTCIXS. Tomahawk land attack missions (TLAM) may also be received 
via TADIXS A and processed by TWCS. 
23. Advanced AA W Correlator Tracker (AACT) - New 
As part of the AEGIS Weapon System (AWS}, the AACT performs: 
1. AA W over-the-horizon (OTH) tracking 
2. real time tracking 
3. track serving for combat displays (a geoserver for map displays) 
4. an archiving and playback server. 
5. sends real time track information to JMCIS 
6. receives OTH tracks and supporting data base information 
7. receives and processes tracks from the CEC and from the C&D suite 
8. sends command orders 
9. sends OTH tracks and track association data to the C&D 
10. provides the track and command display track picture to the Combat Display system. 
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24. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) ·New 
The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) provides a way of merging local/remote 
sensors and weapons from different anti-air warfare ships, thus allowing multiple ships to act as a 
single distributed anti-air warfare unit. The CEC consists of three components on each ship: 
1. a new ship-to-ship communication system called the Data Distribution System 
(DDS) 
2. a new Cooperative Engagement Processor (CEP) 
3. the necessary modifications to the ships' existing combat systems. 
The CEP is an embedded real-time system that communicates directly with the ship's 
combat system from which it obtains local radar plots. These plots are shared with the other 
CEPs via the DDS. Each CEP uses its own plot as well as those received from the other CEPs to 
form identical composite-track databases. CEC depends on the timeliness and concurrence of 
these track databases. The composite track picture overcomes jamming, multipath, and the radar 
horizon limitations on individual ships by forming a single continuous track from all of the 
distributed sensors available. Where no data is available for short periods, CEC projects tracks 
retaining the assigned track number when good data resumes. 
The Cooperative Engagement Decision function will provide for operation of Battle 
Force AA W assets as a single distributed AA W system under adaptive control. Cooperative 
Engagement Prosecutor will allow use of special engagement techniques requiring coordination 
of activities between units, such as "Remote Launch" or "Forward Pass", in response to specific 
tactical situations. 
A major element of the CEC, the Data Distribution System, or DDS, encodes and 
distributes ownship sensor and engagement data to other units and receives and decodes the 
remote data. DDS characteristics include high data capacity, fast response, spread spectrum, 
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distributed network control, adaptive automatic relay capability and a directive phased array 
antenna. 
The DDS consists of special-purpose hardware and computer programs that establish and 
control the jamming-resistant directional data flow between ships equipped with the CEC. The 
computer programs: 
1. manage and monitor the data transfer 
2. track the positions of other units relative to the ownship unit 
3. compute the pairwise communications global schedule governing when each unit 
transmits data to other units 
4. distribute the tactical cooperative engagement data to other units. 
25. Common User Digital Information Exchange Subsystem (CUDIXS)/Naval 
Modular Automated Communications Subsystem (NA VMACS) 
This system provides high volume users with a global, two-way satellite ship-shore 
information exchange capability. It is divided into two major elements: the Common User 
Digital Information Exchange Subsystem (CUDIXS) and the Naval Modular Automated 
Communications Subsystem (NA VMACS). CUDIXS is a shore-based control system that 
provides RF link control of the network and processing of message traffic. NA VMACS uses the 
CUDIXS link-control protocol and processes message traffic at subscriber terminals. 
All UHF satellites have 25-kHz wide channels allocated for CUDIXS/NA VMACS 
transmissions. Each channel is operated as a half-duplex UHF of 2400 bps. Each area 
CUDIXS/NA VMACS network has a dedicated RF channel (DAMA time slot) on its area UHF 
satellite. 
Control of message traffic transmissions on CUDIXS/NA VMACS channels is achieved 
by a polling, controlled-access protocol. Link control is maintained by the CUDIXS processor 
software through a Sequence Order List (SOL). This list specifies for each subscriber the order 
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in which to transmit and the length of that transmission. The transmission portion of the net 
cycle is independent of message length, therefore one message may require several net cycles for 
a complete transmission. Prior to transmission, the subscriber processor queues messages by 
precedence and restructures each message into data blocks. Header information in the data 
blocks is used subsequently by the link-control processor to establis~ traffic precedence level, 
sequence of transmission and the number of data blocks to be transmitted. Even though the time 
for a given net cycle is variable, the average cycle time for the SOL and the subscriber 
transmission is one minute. 
26. EMF/Information Exchange System (EHF/IXS)- New 
By FY 1999 all CGs and DDG 51s will be equipped with AN/USC-38 EHF satellite 
terminals. Beginning in FY96 the Navy will begin installing limited production models of the 
Navy EHF Communications Controller (NECC) which will provide the fleet with data network 
communication services via the AN/USC-38. With NECC, the Navy will have an EHFIIXS 
allowing automated, netted tactical data exchange over jam-resistant EHF satellite links. Ship-
shore-ship and ship-ship tactical data nets will be formed by tactical commanders, as required. 
27. Tactical Information Broadcast Service (TIBS)- New 
TIBS is a multi-source, multi-sensor theater broadcast dissemination service provided by 
an adaptive configuration of producers, communications networks, and users. The network 
provides a continuous secure broadcast of data among sources and data subscribers who are 
interconnected by a common channel in the UHF band. In-theater data providers transmit 
directly to local users via UHF satellite or via UHF line-of-site transmission. Out-of-theater data 
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producers can enter data into the theater TIBS network by direct uplink to a TIBS satellite link or 
through land-line connection to a TIBS network node. A maximum of ten data producers and up 
to 250 receive-only users can be on any one TIBS theater network at one time. TIBS uses a 70-
bit TADIL-J-like format for broadcasting messages. Changes have been made to the TIBS 
message set to accommodate TBM data from TES. 
28. Shipboard Gridlock System/Auto-correlator (SGS/AC) 
SGS/AC provides continuous automatic gridlock between two data-linked units operating 
with three-dimensional radars in an open ocean environment. To allow gridlock, SGS performs 
real-time estimation and correction of shipboard radar coordinate frame systematic misalignment 
errors during intership Link 11 track data exchanges between two ships at sea. The objective of 
this gridlock process is to allow the registration of radar tracks from one ship or aircraft in the 
coordinate system of another ship or aircraft, thereby enabling dependable agreement on 
mutually-held tracks for coordinating defensive decision making and weapons action. 
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III. INFORMATION ARCHITECTURES 
The purpose of this chapter is to capture the changes in the information flow between the 
"as is" Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AA WC) model and the "to be" Theater Ballistic Missile 
Defense Commander (TBMDC) model. The AA WC and the TBMDC wil~ be located on an 
Aegis cruiser. Sections A and B (and the Appendix) were completed by NRAD personnel and 
form the basis for Section C which was completed by the author with assistance from NRAD 
personnel. 
A. INTRODUCTION TO ACTIVITY MODELING 
This introduction is an excerpt that was taken from the final report that accompanied the 
Appendix. [ 10] 
1. Context Diagram 
A context diagram consists of a single process box and its related Inputs, Controls, 
Outputs, and Mechanisms (ICOMs). The process box could be the AO node, or any node below 
it. An ICOM represents a type of information, data, or object that is used by, involved in 
performing, or produced by the process or sub-process node. 
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IDEF 0 Activity Modeling 
Figure 3 
An ICOM has four possible roles relative to a node: 
1. Input. Information or materials which are transformed or consumed in the 
production of the output to a node. (Arrows entering the left side of the node 
box.) 
2. Control. Information or materials that govern or constrain the operation of a 
node. A control regulates the transformation of inputs to outputs. (Arrows 
entering the top of the node box.) 
3. Output. Information or materials that are produced by a node, or result from a 
node. (Arrows leaving the right side of the node box.) 
4. Mechanism. Usually people, machines, resources, or existing systems that 
perform (enable) a node, or provide energy to a node. (Arrows entering the 
bottom of the node box.) 
2. Decomposition Diagram 
A decomposition diagram describes the components of a process, the relationship of 
components of a process, and the relationship of sub-processes (tasks) to one another. During 
decomposition, the modelers read down a process by determining its sub-processes, and the flow 
of ICOMs among them. The ICOMs that interact with other activities or processes outside the 
decomposition diagram are also depicted, to document activity associations. 
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Figure 4 
Unlike a node tree, which can show several levels of sub-processes at once, a 
decomposition diagram shows on each page only one level below the parent process that is being 
decomposed. The modelers must check to ensure that the process views are consistent from one 
level to the next. This breakdown of activities is repeated for each activity as long as the 
breakdown enhances the users understanding of the process and the entity's point of view is 
maintained. 
3. IDEFO Review Guidelines 
An IDEFO model should be read in a global manner rather than concentrating on one area 
of the model. The process and the information flows must be understood in relation to the rest of 
the model. The following steps provide guidance in reviewing a model in its entirety: 
1. Scan the process (boxes) within the model to understand the subject area. 
2. Review the context diagram and study the information flows. Identify the 
primary information flows (arrows). 
3. Identify the primary information flows of the decomposition diagrams. Attempt 
to form a thread of major information flows among the processes. 
4. Use this thread of information flows to walk through the series of processes. 
5. Review the main story being told. 
6. Review all supporting document$: FOE diagrams, process narratives, 
information flow (ICOM) definitions and any notes. 
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L_ _________________________________________________________________________ _ 
B. THE "AS IS" INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE 
The "as is" architecture will be defined in a IDEFO model located in Appendix A. This 
model was created by NRAD for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. It has been 
approved by the Director of Theater Air Defense (TAD) as the model that best describes the 
functions performed by the AA WC in an air-warfare environment on an Aegis cruiser. The "as 
is" architecture is included in this thesis to help demonstrate the changes, both necessary and 
inevitable, to the information exchange requirements when including ballistic missile defense as 
an additional role for the Aegis cruiser. "The purpose of the "Navy AAWC Process Model" is to 
capture the activities and information flow from the Navy AAW Warfare Area Commander and 
the organic (carrier battle group) and non-organic Goint forces not assigned to the carrier battle 
group) assets that contribute to the AAW defensive mission." 
C. THE "TO-BE" INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE 
1. Context Diagram Definitions 
(AO) PERFORM TBMD OPERATIONS 
TBMD operations from the viewpoint of the TBMD commander are defined in "Concepts for 
Integrated (Naval component) Battle Organization, 15 October 1995". The TBMD Commander 
is responsible for the defense from TBMs of the battle group as well as those assets assigned to 
him by the CJTF. 
Centralized planning and decentralized execution is the premise on which active defense 
is based. This requires the surveillance of a wide area (with. emphasis on likely launch areas) and 
the integration of active defense TBMD forces (into a theater air defense BMC41 system) in order 
to exchange track, intelligence, and I& W information between forces. The command and control 
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plan (available to support this dynamic, time-critical effort) must be supported by an effective 
naval as well as a joint organization architecture with information flow requirements carefully 
orchestrated. 
(AO.l) PLAN TBMD OPERATIONS 
Planning for active defense will focus on the capabilities to achieve a hard kill against most 
TBMs which are launched against the defended area. Theater-wide active defense systems 
include AEGIS ships, the HAWK missile system, the PATRIOT system, and THAAD/GBR. 
Coordination of active defense relies upon the flexibility and responsiveness of the BMC4I 
architecture to realize its full effectiveness. TBMD requires clear, flexible rules of engagement 
(ROE) from the Unified Commander so that decision makers can act quickly and decisively. 
Active defense exploits early warning and cueing to gain the best possible tracking and targeting 
coverage. Active defense requires the determination of whether a potential target meets 
engagement criteria and coordination among many elements. In an optimal situation, the plan 
will offer multiple engagement opportunities against each target by the TBMD forces. As 
importantly, the active defense system requires accurate kill assessment for every engagement. 
The types of TBM warheads which threaten the DAL are as important to the AADC' s 
planning as the launch areas and targets. The positioning of the units conducting the active 
defense provide cueing and tracking coverage critically effects the engagement strategy for every 
attack. 
Active defense planning builds upon the available forces and identifies any additional 
forces which are required. Planning for active defense includes coordination with firing units 
having other mission assignments and detection/tracking systems in order to define which forces 
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are dedicated to TBMD active defense as a primary mission, and what forces can rapidly be 
reassigned for TBMD active defense from other missions. 
Command, control, and coordination for active defense is based upon the operational 
assessment of TBMD scenarios. Planners will tailor the CRI system for effective TBMD 
response within the projected AOR and timelines. Command roles .and functions will be 
assigned to the best-suited commanders, aligning supporting elements in a horizontal and vertical 
integration. Active defense plans provide: 
1. guidance to units establishing the doctrinal statements 
2. location and coverage assignment 
3. the integration of CEC-capable and non-CEC-capable forces. 
The result is command and control that ensures the most-rapid, reliable paths are established for 
TBMD warning and cueing information. 
The TBMD commander must coordinate closely with USSP ACECOM to make use of the 
space-based warning system. 
(Al.l) ASSESS TBMD CAPABILITIES 
Assessment of friendly forces' capabilities is an evaluation of how well they can perform against 
the threat's intentions. The accuracy of the assessment is crucial to the overall performance of 
the TBMD mission and is based on the accuracy of intelligence and other information. 
Assessment includes: 
1. friendly and enemy order of battle 
2. demonstrated proficiency 
3. training level 
4. pattern of operation 
5. assets to be defended 
6. any indications and warnings. 
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(Al.l.l) ASSESS ENEMY OFFENSIVE TBM CAPABILITY 
The assessing of enemy offensive TBM capabilities is an evaluation of the threat and the 
perceived threat's intentions. The accuracy of this assessment is crucial to the overall: 
1. tactical decisions 
2. performance of the mission 
3. execution of the plan. 
(A1.1.2) ASSESS OWN FORCE TBMD CAPABILITIES 
The assessing of own force TBMD capabilities/available weapons is an evaluation of how well 
own forces can perform against the threat's intentions. The accuracy of this assessment is crucial 
to the overall: 
1. tactical decisions 
2. performance of the mission 
3. the execution of the plan. 
(Al.l.3) PERFORM INTEGRATION OF ASSESSMENT 
The TBMD commander produces an overall assessment of all hostile TBM capabilities and all 
friendly TBMD capabilities in the theater of operations. 
(A1.2) DEVELOP DRAFT TBMD PLAN 
Using the experience of his staff, the TBMD Commander creates a draft plan to defend all assets 
under his protection in the most efficient manner possible 
(A1.2.1) CREATE PLAN 
Given the boundaries of the controls, members of the TBMD commander's staff (wardroom) 
create an initial plan to defend all assets under the TBMD commander's protection. 
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(A1.2.2) REVIEW PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE 
The initial plan is reviewed for compliance with other requirements such as ROE, Higher 
Echelon Guidance, SOP etc. Once the initial plan is deemed compliant, it is released for 
coordination. 
(A1.3) COORDINATE TBMD PLAN 
The TBMD commander coordinates his plan with other non-organic TBMD units and higher 
echelon authority. When approved, he prepares it to be released as an OPT ASK supplement. 
(A1.3.1) COORDINATE TBMD DRAFT PLAN WITH ORGANIC UNITS 
A draft TBMD plan is coordinated with organic units to resolve deconfliction. 
(A1.3.2) COORDINATE TBMD DRAFT PLAN WITH NON-ORGANIC UNITS 
The TBMD Commander coordinates the draft TBMD plan with non-organic units to resolve 
possible deconfliction. 
(A1.3.3) FINALIZE TBMD PLAN 
The coordinated (organic and non-organic) TBMD plan is verified to be compliant with Higher 
Echelon Guidance and ROE .. The TBMD plan will then be released in the form of the TBMD 
OPT ASK/Supplement 
(A1.4) PROMULGATE OPT ASK/ SUPPLEMENT 
The coordinated TBMD plan is issued as the .OPT ASK TBMD supplement. 
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(A0.2) EXECUTE TBMD OPERATIONS 
TBMD is composed of four operation elements: attack operations, active defense operations, 
passive defense operations, and BMC41. The TBMD commander will not actively participate in 
the attack operations phase of the TBMD mission. These applicable elements have the following 
general characteristics: 
Active Defense Operations apply to operations initiated to protect against a TBM attack by 
destroying the missiles in flight. Active defense includes multi-tiered defense in depth via 
multiple engagements, possibly using air, land and sea forces. It also may include electronic 
attack (EA) operations to disrupt guidance systems. 
Passive Defense Operations are measures initiated to reduce vulnerability and to minimize the 
effects of damage caused by TBM attack. Passive defense includes TBM early warning, nuclear, 
biological and chemical (NBC) protection, counter-surveillance, deception, camouflage and 
concealment, hardening, electronic warfare, mobility, dispersal, redundancy, recovery and 
reconstitution. 
Battle Management C41 CBMC41) is an integrated system of doctrine, procedures, organizational 
structures, facilities, communicati~ns, computers and intelligence that support and enhance the 
other three operational elements. It includes missile warning and cueing of defense systems by 
missile warning sensors and ground stations. C41 provides command authorities at all levels 
with timely and accurate data and systems to plan, monitor, direct, control and report TBMD 
operations. 
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(A2.1) OBSERVE TBMD THREAT 
This function establishes, maintains the battle space non-organic track data and coordinates non-
organic TBM cueing and warning to non-organic units. 
(A2.1.1) OBTAIN TBM INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING 
The TBMD commander defines potential threats for his area of responsibility using intelligence 
information. 
(A2.1.2) PREPOSITION ASSETS 
The TBMD commander positions (AOR) sensors and firing units for the best possible coverage 
for TBM which threaten DAL. 
(A2.1.3) OBTAIN TBM LAUNCH INDICATIONS 
The TBMD commander correlates ballistic missile launches from all sources. 
(A2.1.4) OBTAIN NON-ORGANIC TRACK DATA 
Fusing the tactical picture is the process of combining indications, warning and launch 
detections/indications with incoming non-organic track data. The incoming data will also aid in 
the cueing of own ship sensors. 
(A2.1.5) ID TRACK 
Identifying the track is the process of taking non-organic track data and categorizing it as a 
possible BM threat. Organic sensors may or may not have acquired this track. 
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(A2.2)V ALIDATE TBMD THREAT 
Once threat track data has been detected and acquired by organic sensors, the track is coordinated 
with non-organic units and if the track is within the area of responsibility, a course of action 
using organic units is considered. 
(A2.2.1) ACQUIRE WITH OWN SHIP SENSOR 
This function is the process of acquiring a track with own ship organic sensors for the purpose of 
tracking the contact. The acquisition may have been cued by organic or non-organic sensors, or 
the organic sensor may have made the initial acquisition. 
(A2.2.2) VALIDATE ORGANIC TRACK 
This process takes the newly acquired track and validates it as a TBM. 
(A2.2.3) CORRELATE ORGANIC TRACK WITH NON-ORGANIC TRACK DATA 
This process compares the organic valid track with the track from a non-organic sensor to verify 
that they are the same track. 
(A2.3) DECIDE COURSES OF ACTION 
The TBMD Commander interacts with other warfare commanders, service, and allied units to 
develop the engagement plan. The recommended course of action will include the concept of 
operations and evaluation of sensors/weapons estimates. He also recommends non-organic 
support, directs control actions and sends force orders to organic assets for TBMD action. 
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(A2.3.1) EVALUATE IMPACT POINT VS DEFENDED ASSET LIST 
This process predicts the enemy TBM impact points, and determines which assets are capable of 
engaging which contacts, from the individual unit (DAL) areas of responsibility. 
(A2.3.2) ESTABLISH PRIORITY TARGETS 
Target prioritization is obtained by performing assessment of the: 
1. evaluated impact point data 
2. TBMD target 
3. ROE 
4. Higher Echelon Guidance 
5. TBMD OPTASK/Supplement. 
(A2.3.3) COORDINATE ASSIGNMENT WITH NON -ORGANIC UNITS 
The TBMD Commander coordinates the assigned target prioritization with non-organic units and 
establishes the coordinated Course of Action. 
(A2.3.4) ASSIGN SHOOTER TO TARGET 
The TBMD Commander assigns organic units' weapons to targets based on the coordinated 
Course of Action. 
(A2.4) EXECUTE TBMD ACTION 
The TBMD Commander provides assets to be defended, force orders, warnings and weapon 
status to organic assets Rules of engagement and guidance are provided to the TBMD 
Commander by higher authority. 
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(A0.3) MAINTAIN TBMD READINESS 
The TBMD readiness function monitors TBMD force readiness and performs the support 
functions needed to ensure appropriate levels of force preparedness. Activities such as training, 
maintaining equipment readiness and logistic support are included in this function. 
(A3.1) TRAIN FORCE IN TBMD OPERATIONS 
The pre-deployment and enroute training is determined and scheduled by the Fleet CINC, Type 
Commander, Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)/Composite Warfare Commander (CWC), the 
Air Warfare Commander and the TBMD Commander. The training objective is to develop skills 
and teamwork among organic and non-organic TBMD assets. Enroute training should 
complement the pre-sail training. Readiness data is forwarded by organic platforms to the 
OTC/CWC and used to estimate capabilities/readiness and refine further training. Space, shore-
based and other non-organic assets provide environmental data and simulations of surveillance 
products to support the exercise. 
(A3.1.1) DETERMINE TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
The TBMD skills and capability to work as a team is evaluated as a result of required training 
and training feedback. The training requirements are then established and scheduled. 
(A3.1.2) TRAIN IN SIMULATED TBMD ENVIRONMENT 
The TBMD operator trains to specified training objectives. Performance data is provided as 
status of TBMD operators, and it is used to estimate personnel capabilities/readiness and refine 
further training. Feedback is also provided in support of training evaluations. 
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(A3.1.3) CONDUCT SINGLE UNIT TRAINING 
TBMD unit trains to specified training objectives. Performance data is provided as status of 
TBMD unit readiness. It is used to estimate capabilities/readiness and refine further training. 
Feedback is also provided in support of evaluation of training requirements. 
(A3.1.4) CONDUCT BATTLE GROUP TRAINING 
Same as (A3.1.3) for Battle Groups 
(A3.1.5) CONDUCT JOINT OPERATIONS TRAINING 
Same as (A3.1.3) for Joint Operations 
(A3.2) MAINTAIN TBMD SYSTEMS READINESS 
To maintain TBMD systems readiness status, organic force assets report changes in status for the 
TBMD equipment/systems to the TBMD commander who reports to the Officer in Tactical 
Command, who reports to higher authority. Individual platforms repair battle damage and 
maintain their own systems as necessary. Individual platforms may modify assignments (when 
approved) to compensate for degradation among platforms. Also, the Fleet Commander/Fleet 
CINC may replace force assets when damage is sufficiently severe or if other assets can be made 
available. 
(A3.3) MAINTAIN TBMD LOGISTICS READINESS 
Planners must estimate the likely firing rate for TBM interceptors based on the planned 
engagement doctrine and the individual systems available in order to manage the weapons stocks. 
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This will govern the plans for resupplying the force, including individual unit firing doctrine, 
during engagements. Planners will determine whether to attempt to distribute firing assignments 
among engagement units to maintain a uniform rate of expenditure across the force or to 
concentrate firing assignments among a subset of firing units to empty their magazines first 
(freeing them for other missions and for rearming), while maintaining other units on-station as a 
TBMD force. 
2. Navy TBMD Interoperability Architecture IDEFO Diagrams 
The following are the IDEFO Diagrams used to describe the function "Perform TBMD 
Operations." The overall function of performing TBMD operations is broken down into three 
sub-functions: planning, execution and maintaining of TBMD operations. Those sub-functions 
are in turn broken down into more descriptive functions as described in Chapter III's sub-section 
Cl. 
The IDEFO diagrams were prepared during thesis research visits to NRaD with the 
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3. ICOM Definitions 
a. AEGIS Combat Training System (ACTS) 
The on-board trainer that is integrated into the AEGIS weapon system. 
b. AIR DEFENSE PLAN (ADP) 
The Air Defense Plan (ADP) is developed and modified by the Area Air Defense Commander 
(AADC). In a maritime environment these responsibilities will normally be assigned to the 
JF ACC (Afloat) who may delegate responsibility to the AA WC and the CV Air Operations 
Officer. The ADP establishes area air defense responsibilities(AOR), airspace control 
procedures, provides as organization structure, sets alert requirements, and establishes Minimum 
Risk Routing (MRR). 
c. AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM 
A totally integrated shipboard weapon system that combines computers, radars, and missiles to 
provide a defensive umbrella for surface shipping. The system is capable of automatically 
detecting, tracking, and destroying airborne, seaborne, and land-launched weapons [10]. 
d. ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY OFFENSIVE TBM CAPABILITIES 
Assessment of enemy capability is an evaluation of the threat and the perceived threat's 
intentions for the day. The accuracy of the assessment is crucial to the overall performance of 
the mission and is based on the accuracy of intelligence information [11]. 
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e. ASSESSMENT OF OWN FORCE TBMD CAPABILITIES 
Assessment of friendly capability is an evaluation of own forces and how well they can perform 
against the threat's intentions. The accuracy of the assessment is crucial to the overall 
performance of the mission and is based on the accuracy of intelligence information [ 12]. 
f. ASSIGNED TARGET 
An enemy theater ballistic missile (TBM) that has been assigned to an organic TBMD weapon 
system. 
g. BATTLESPACE EVALUATION 
Battlespace evaluation comes from Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), and defines 
the area of operations, and focuses intelligence assets on the battlespace [13]. 
h. C4I SYSTEMS 
The facilities, equiptment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential to a commander 
for planning, directing, and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to the mission 
assigned. [ 14] 
i. COORDINATED COA 
The TBMD commander interacts with other warfare commanders, services, and allied units to 
coordinate all activities through the engagement phase. This information is the TBMD 
commander's planned course of actions. Coordinated COA is used to accomplish a mission. The 
coordinated COA is a product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System 
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development phase. The supported commander will recommend a course of action to the 
commander. The recommended course of action will include: 
1. the concept of operations 
2. evaluation of supportability estimates of supporting organizations 
3. and an integrated time-phased data base of combat, combat support, and combat 
service support forces and sustainment. 
When approved, the course of action becomes the basis for the development of an operation plan 
or operation order [15]. 
j. COORDINATED NON-ORGANIC TBM CUEING AND WARNING 
This is TBM cueing and warning data detected by organic assets and relayed to non-organic 
assets. 
k. COORDINATED TBMD ACTIONS 
These are TBMD actions by organic assets during the execution of TMBD operations sent up and 
down the chain of command and to civilian authorities. 
I. COORDINATED TBMD DRAFT PLAN 
The coordinated TBMD Draft Plan is an initial plan of how the commander intends to carry out 
his mission that has been coordinated with the non-organic units. 
m. COORDINATED VALIDATED TBMD THREAT 
TBMD threats that have been validated by organic sensors. 
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n. COORDINATION EXECUTION INFORMATION 
Execution information contains information concerning organic and non-organic assets and 
missile launches for the purpose of coordination. Short missile flight times require that available 
air-, land-, sea-, and space-based sensor/surveillance reports be integrated to provide a complete 
and current air and space picture. The coordination includes strike and attack operation assets. 
o. CUEING, WARNING AND INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURES 
Cues can come from space-based, airborne, or surface-based assets. When cues are to be 
provided from other than organic assets, special coordination may be required to ensure the 
cueing system and link provisions are in place. Generally (although scenario and TBM range 
dependent), the more rapid, accurate, and precise the cue, the shorter the time to acquire the 
target [16]. An enemy launch observed and identified through national, theater, or tactical 
surveillance systems triggers active defense and attack operations, along with initiating passive 
defense measures by military units and civilian authorities. TBM trajectory data are passed to 
surface- or air-based point (including self-protection) and area defensive systems. Depending on 
data quality, cueing of higher resolution sensor systems may be necessary to provide target 
engagement data immediately or to determine launcher locations. Enemy launch locations and 
other targeting information are passed simultaneously to appropriate units and commands with 
attack operations missions. Area systems, such as some surface-to-air missile systems or 
interceptors, provide defense in-depth by attacking TBMs at long ranges. Engaging missiles early 
in flight permits multiple engagements by the area and point defense systems and minimizes 
ground damage to friendly forces and infrastructure from missile and warhead debris. Active 
electronic countermeasures systems also can deceive TBM guidance systems late in flight [17]. 
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p. DEFENDED ASSET LIST AND COURSE OF ACTION PRIORITIES 
Defended Asset List (DAL) priorities and the Courses Of Action (COA) priorities are supplied 
by the Joint Staffs and require the defense of those DAL in the most efficient and effective 
manner. It is this phase of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System within the crisis 
action planning process that provides for the development of military responses and includes 
(within the limits of the time allowed): 
1. establishing force and sustainment requirements with actual units 
2. evaluating force, logistic, and transportation feasibility 
3. identifying and resolving resource shortfalls 
4. recommending resource allocations 
5. and producing a course of action via a commander's estimate that contains a concept of 
operations, employment concept, risk assessments, prioritized courses of action, and 
supporting data bases. 
A course of action is developed on the best economic, diplomatic, political, and military 
judgment, designed to dissuade an adversary from a currentcourse of action or operation.[18] 
q. DOCTRINE 
Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in 
support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. [ 19] 
r. DRAFT TBMD PLAN 
The draft TBMD plan is an initial plan of how the TBMD Commander intends to carry out his 
mission. 
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s. ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION UPDATE 
This engagement update is near real time information coming from the TBMD units. The update 
includes unit capabilities, weapon status, and engagement status, engagement assessments and 
BDA. 
t. ENGAGEMENT PROCEDURES 
Engagement procedures are descriptions of the employment of organic weapon systems in the 
most effective manner, for example, the employment of salvo fires (shoot-shoot-look-shoot). 
u. EVALUATED IMPACT POINT 
Determination from the impact point predictor of whether the impact point of a projectile, bomb, 
or re-entry vehicle falls into an organic asset's defended area. 
v. FORCE ORDERS 
The TBMDC and his force TAOs assess the tactical situation and execute command and control 
over TBMD forces to perform all aspects of the TBMD mission. This includes the required 
command, control, actions, and force orders for the force assets (F-14, F-18 and missile systems) 
to engage targets with hard kill weapons. Force orders are defined as one of the following [20]: 
1. Weapons Free - Fire may be opened on any target( s) that has (have ) not been 
identified as FRIEND. 
2. Weapons Safe- Fire may be opened only in self defense or in response to a formal 
order. 
3. Weapons Tight- Do not open fire unless target(s) has(have) been identified as 
HOSTILE. 
4. Cease Fire -Discontinue firing; complete intercept if missile is in flight; continue to 
track. 
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5. Hold Fire- This order directs units to withhold or cease fire on the designated track .. 
Guidance for semiactive missiles which are already in flight should be discontinued. 
Hold Fire is an emergency order that temporarily terminates a particular engagement 
or restricts firing in a particular airspace. A Hold Fire order applies to a specific 
aircraft, missile unit, sector, altitude, or corridor. 
Report of results of force orders execution is performed through secure radio reports between the 
AA WC and the BG Commander followed up with SITREP. 
w. HIGHER COMMAND AUTHORITY SITUATION ASSESSMENT 
This information transfer consists of the JFC's estimate of the situation, statement of objectives, 
and overall concept of operations. Based on the JFC's guidance and priorities, JTMD forces and 
resources are assigned [21]. 
x. HIGHER ECHELON GUIDANCE 
This guidance is provided to the TBMD commander through the Integrated Battle Organization 
from the MAADC. The guidance provided by the Battle Group Commander (physically located 
on the carrier) is a result of an interactive coordinated efforts in the theater of operations. As the 
theater matures and becomes a sustained theater of operation less guidance is required. This 
guidance may be: 
1. Warning Orders 
2. Alert Orders 
3. Operations Orders (OPORD). 
This guidance follows a five section format that contains: 
1. Situation 




5. Command and Control information. 
Also included are all applicable OPT ASKS. 
y. HIGHER ECHELON GUIDANCE/FORMAT/ADDRESSEE 
Any information from higher authority promulgating the format and content of structured 
messages. (ATP-4, JPl, APP-4/ATP-lC/NWP 10-1012, NWP 10-1013(SUPPS 1-6, JOINT 
PUB 1-02) 
z. INITIAL PLAN 
This is the TBMD Commander's initial plan that is checked for compliance with outside 
directives/orders. 
aa. INTEGRA TED THREAT 
Threat integration comes from Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace(IPB) and ties 
battlespace evaluation, terrain analysis, meteorological assessment, and threat evaluation steps 
together to give the commander a multi-dimensional view of the battlespace [22]. 
bb. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF BATTLESPACE (IPB) 
This intellegence information is used to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, 
and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an 
extensive data base for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The data 
base is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on 
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operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a 
continuing process [23]. 
Analysis and target development of tactical missile (TM) threats should begin during 
peacetime. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace drives the development of a collection 
plan, which in turn identifies: 
1. sensor types 
2. collection windows 
3. areas of coverage. 
Development and refinement of a data base on threat TM capability( both indigenous and 
imported) must be a continuous process. IPB products are used to evaluate enemy capabilities, 
vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. This process: 
1. assists in situation/target development by showing commanders when/where they can 
most effectively engage the enemy 
2. contributes significantly to the process of area limitation analysis 
3. and ultimately to automated cueing ofTMD sensors and weapon systems to 
threatening targets. 
IPB includes updating TM data bases to maintain and provide near-real-time status of 
selected enemy TM-related capabilities (e.g., orders of battle, operating bases; type, range, and 
employment techniques of available missiles and/or warheads; missile launch, load, hide, and 
support sites; potential routes; intelligence and electronic warfare (lEW) systems; C2 nodes, and 
enemy defenses) [24]. 
The Joint Staff and CINC staffs should address the following objectives when preparing 
an IPB for a given region [25]: 
1. Location of missile manufacturing and assembly plants 
2. Locations of fixed missile launch facilities 
3. Locations of missile storage facilities 
4. Locations of missile fuel storage facilities 
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5. Identification and locations of missile firing units 
6. Number of mobile launch systems 
7. Numbers and types of ballistic missiles 
8. Numbers and types of missile warheads (e.g., WMDs) 
9. Numbers and types of cruise missiles 
10. Capabilities of missile/warhead combinations 
11. Delivery systems available for cruise missiles 
12. Ballistic and cruise missile doctrine 
13. Detailed analysis of enemy TM doctrine and terrain 
14. Anticipated enemy courses of actions (COA) 
15. Approaches that can be used to develop appropriate responses to enemy COA 
cc. LOGISTIC INFORMATION UPDATE 
This is any information that is applicable to logistics such as casualty reports and number of 
weapons fired. 
dd. MANNING REQUIREMENTS 
The level to which a given unit is manned as defined by the Bureau of Naval Personnel. 
ee. METEOROLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 
This information includes meteorological facts pertaining to the atmosphere, such as wind, 
temperature, air density, and other phenomena which affect military operations [26]. 
ff. MISSILE CUING DATA 
Information provided to the TBMD ·Commander concerning launch warnings, launch point and 
time determination, kinematics, threat type determination, impact point and time prediction, 
weapons cuing, and communications, etc. [27] Comes from multiple sources including space 
based components, special operation forces, USSP ACECOM and airborne assets. 
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gg. NAVY WIDE OPT ASK 
This information transfer contains: tactical situation, schedule of events, threat information, 
ROE, friendly/neutral/hostile air characteristics, minimum risk route information, TBMD 
capabilities, connectivity, surveillance loading, own force capabilities, performance assessment, 
joining/departing units, unit readiness, and impact of other warfare operations [28]. 
hh. NON-COMPLIANCE PLAN ISSUES 
Issues that arise by assessing the initial plan for compliance with ROE, political considerations, 
ADP and higher command authority situation assessment. 
ii. NON-ORGANIC COORDINATION INFORMATION 
Close coordination among component commanders, the JFC, and the AADC (if designated) is 
necessary to employ the most appropriate resources and measures to execute JTMD operations 
and to ensure a synergistic effort. Component-to-component coordination may also be required in 
some situations as a result of the compressed timelines and short reaction times inherent in 
JTMD operations. Coordination among component commanders for JTMD operations usually 
includes: 
1. Components' concepts of operations and assigned missions for JTMD operations. 
2. Requests for employment of JFC and supporting CINC sensors. 
3. Targeting and target deconfliction for both attack and active defense operations. 
4. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations and capabilities. 
5. Employment and placement of air and airspace control measures and procedures, naval 
and amphibious control measures, and fire support coordinating measures. 
6. Joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD). 
7. Area air defense operations. 
8. Special operations. 
9. C4I. 
10. Command and control warfare (C2W). 
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11. EW operations and capabilities. 
12. Passive defense measures, including deception operations. 
13. C41 protection operations. [29] 
jj. NON-ORGANIC COORDINATION PLAN INFORMATION 
This information transfer contains preplanned non-real time information that deals with 
responses, stationing, engagement, and reporting for the purpose of coordination with non-
organic assets. 
kk. NON-ORGANIC ENGAGEMENT INFORMATION 
Non-organic near real time missile information comes from non-organic units relative to TBMD 
assets such as location, material status, manning, and logistics. 
II. NON-ORGANIC ENGAGEMENT STATUS 
This is near real time data that provides tactical data such as weapon status, engagement states, 
engagement assessment, etc. from the non-organic units. 
mm. NON-ORGANIC I&W AND MISSILE THREAT DATA PROCEDURES 
From higher echelon authority we receive additional intelligence, warning and missile threat 
data. 
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nn. NON-ORGANIC SENSOR DATA 
Non-organic sensor data is a representation of facts, concepts, or instructions about sensors in a 
formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by 
automatic means [30]. 
oo. NON-ORGANIC TBMD PLAN 
This communication contains the non-organic Commanders TBMD plan for the purpose of 
coordination. 
pp. NON-ORGANIC THREAT TRACK DATA 
Confirmed or possible ballistic missile track data comes from non-organic assets. Once track 
data has been detected and acquired, it is evaluated and identified as a friend, foe or unknown. 
For the "unknown contacts, i.e., non-cooperative target recognition compliant" information such 
as altitude, speed, flight pattern are correlated with friendly flight plans, friendly flight corridors, 
commercial air routes, MRR procedures, and any other information available for positive 
identification. Should all of these methods fail to produce positive identification, the track is 
designated as unknown. Effective measures designed to provide timely identification include 
positive radar control, visual control, flight plans, IFF, and air corridors. A detailed discussion of 
these measures is found in NWP 32. 
qq. NON-ORGANIC UNIT CAPABILITIES 
Non-organic engagement status, weapon system, sensor parameters, and capability information 
comes from non-organic assets to the TBMD Commander. This consists of near real time data 
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from a non-organic asset that provides tactical data such as the weapon status, engagement status, 
engagement assessment, etc. 
rr. NON-REAL TIME NON-ORGANIC MISSILE INFORMATION 
This information is relative to TBMD non-organic assets such as: 
1. location 
2. type of platform 
3. material status 
4. manning status 
5. logistic status. 
ss. ORGANIC COORDINATED TBMD DRAFT PLAN 
This communication contains the TBMD Draft Plan that has been coordinated with other TBMD 
organic assets. 
tt. ORGANIC ENGAGEMENT STATUS 
This communication contains information concerning the status of organic assets' engagements 
with TBMD targets. 
uu. ORGANIC SENSOR DATA 
Sensor data provided by organic assets is a representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a 
formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by 
automatic means [31]. 
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vv. ORGANIC TBMD LOGISTIC REPORTS 
The report is directed to the BGC, CJTF and CINC. The report includes weapons inventory, fuel 
status, equipment causality reports, personnel status, etc. 
ww. OWN SHIP POSSIBLE TBM TRACK 
This information will normally be transfered within a piece of equipment. It is the initial 
detection of a track by the organic system's radars, before it becomes a confirmed track. 
xx. OWN SIDP TBM TRACK 
Data received from organic assets about a TBM track, such as type, kinematics, position, 
velocity, and acceleration, disseminated to organic assets and non-organic units. 
yy. PERSONNEL TO BE TRAINED 
Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the assigned 
mission. This consists of requirements for personnel to enhance their capacity to perform TBMD 
functions and tasks. 
zz. PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS 
All known physical factors affecting military operations, including time, space, weather and 
terrain. 
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ab. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The information from higher authority on: 
1. whether the contemplated course of action is worth the cost in manpower, material, 
and time involved 
2. is consistent with the law of war 
3. and militarily and politically supportable [32]. 
ac. POSITIONED ASSETS 
From the TBMD Commander, to organic assets directing those assets' positions to provide the 
most effective response to the TBMD threat. 
ad. POTENTIAL THREAT 
From multiple sources to the TBMD Commander, defining the existing TBMD threats. 
ae. RECEIVED MISSILE LAUNCH INDICATION 
From multiple organic or non-organic sources to the TBM Commander giving the early 
notification of a hostile ballistic missile launch. 
af. RECEIVED TRACK DATA 
Data received from non-organic sources about a TBM track such as type, and kinematics, in 
position, velocity, and acceleration. 
ag. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military authorities which 
delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or 
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continue combat engagement with other forces. ROE should be delineated, published, and 
disseminated to and exercised by alliance members for compliance and as a planning 
consideration for future operations. Any national ROE that differs from the multinational ROE 
should be identified, published, and understood by all national commands.[33] 
ah. ROE CHANGE REQUESTS 
Request changes to the ROE from the TBMD Commander to the BGC, DJTF and CINC. 
ai. SCHEDULED EXERCISES 
A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and 
execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, 
joint, or single-service exercise, depending on participating organizations [34]. 
aj. SCHEDULED LOGISTICS SUPPORT 
A scheduled composite of all the support considerations necessary to assure the effective and 
economical support of all TBMD assets. It is an integral part of all other aspects of system 
acquisition and operation such as refueling, rearming, spare parts and food replenishment [35]. 
ak. SCHEDULED SYSTEM MAINTENANCE 
Periodic prescribed inspection and/or servicing of TBMD related equipment accomplished on a 
calendar, mileage, or hours of operation basis. Also included is scheduled system down time to 
perform this maintenance. The maintenance schedule must be coordinated with operations staff 
to insure TBMD coverage. 
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al. SENSOR DATA 
Any sensor data from organic or non-organic units used by the TBMD Commander to 
accomplish his mission. 
am. STATUS OF TBMD BATTLE GROUP READINESS 
The capability of a battle group to perform the missions or functions for which it is organized or 
designed. 
an. STATUS OF TBMD EQUIPMENT READINESS 
The status about which equipment and systems are capable of performing the missions or 
functions for which they were organized or designed. 
ao. STATUS OF TBMD LOGISTICS READINESS 
The status of TBMD logistic readiness from assets. This includes the ability to deliver the 
outputs for which they were designed which includes the ability to deploy and employ without 
unacceptable delays. Key among the many factors that should be considered when developing 
sustainment plans for JTMD operations are: 
1. deployment of the weapons to their area of employment 
2. resupply of ammunition 
3. repair parts 
4. supporting equipment 
5. fuel 
6. supporting personnel. 
US doctrine requires services to provide their own logistic support; however, the CINCs are 
authorized to exercise directive authority over logistic and transportation priorities based on 
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transportation capacity, transportation requirements, and urgency of need. Transportation assets 
can be more efficiently used and transportation requirements more readily met through early 
assessment of the theater's logistic requirements. Early planning will permit the CINCs to fully 
exploit more efficient, but slower, sealift assets. Ground-based TMD systems can also be 
transported by air into a theater, but this places an additional burden on the US airlift capacity. 
CINCs must balance the increased risk of imminent TM attack with the cost associated with 
diverting airlift assets for the deployment of JTMD forces. If CINCs alter the TPFDL to meet 
TMD requirements, they must assess the cost of doing so in terms of the effects this will have on 
overall theater logistic operations. 
ap. STATUS OF TBMD.OPERATOR READINESS 
The capability of operators to perform the missions or functions for which they are trained. 
aq. STATUS OF TBMD PERSONNEL READINESS 
The communication defines the status of the qualified personnel required to accomplish assigned 
missions. 
ar. STATUS OF TBMD TASK FORCE READINESS 
The capability of a task force to perform the missions or functions for which it is trained. 
as. STATUS OF TBMD UNIT READINESS 
The capability of an unit to perform the missions or functions for which it is trained. 
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at. TARGET PRIORITIZATION 
A prioritized list of targets relative to organic assets. The list may have high priority for more 
than one shooter if the impact point is within their A OR. The list may have very low priority for 
all organic assets if the impact point is outside organic assets' area of responsibility (AOR). 
au. TBM THREAT COMPONENTS 
The TBMD Commander defines the parameters to be evaluated to determine which contact is a 
TBMD threat. 
av. TBMD CAPABILITIES 
This signal contains an assessment of the capabilities of all assets organic and non-organic to 
perform the TBMD mission. 
aw. TBMD OPTASK/SUPPLEMENT 
This report generated by the TBMD Commander relates to the force required to accomplish the 
overall TBMD plan. The OPT ASK TBMD Supplement specifies: 
1. the procedures 
2. the predetermined responses 
3. the assets management for the AAW mission, to the AADC for inclusion as an annex 
to the Air Warfare Plan. 
COMSECONDFLT, COMTHIRDFL T, COMSIXTHFL T, and COMSEVENTHFL T promulgate 
the Navy-wide OPTASK TBMD that is the standing OPT ASK message. Prior to deployment the 
AA WC/CVBG releases a supplement to the OPT ASK specific for the Battle Group tailored to 
the available assets and mission. As the physical location of the Battle Group changes, 
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supplements are revised as necessary. The OPT ASK TBMD Supplement may be further 
modified by the Daily Intentions Message [36]. 
ax. TBMD PLAN 
This plan is the unformatted TBMD OPT ASK/Supplement. 
ay. TBMD PLANNING TOOL 
This is a software tool that enables the TBMD Commander to pool information from various 
sources that provides any applicable TBMD data such as tactical data bases, enemy orders of 
battle, etc. This software will support the development of the draft TBMD plan and any 
·necessary supporting briefings. 
az. TBMDTARGET 
TBMD target is a target that has been validated by organic sensors and ID. 
ba. TBMD THREAT COMPONENT 
The distinguishing characteristics of a ballistic missile that make it an identifiable target (i.e., 
velocity and altitude). 
be. TERRAIN ANALYSIS 
The collection, analysis, evaluation; and interpretation of geographic information on the natural 
and manmade features of the terrain to predict the effect of the terrain on military operations [1]. 
Terrain analysis evaluates the effects of geography, terrain, and bathymetry on friendly/adversary 
capabilities to maneuver, attack, employ sensors, and communicate [37]. 
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bd. THREAT EVALUATION 
Threat evaluation data encompasses a detailed study of the threat and a predictive analysis of 
probable adversary courses of action and friendly force survivability for each case [38]. 
be. TRAINING FEEDBACK 
The feedback to training provides the lessons learned from training with possible 
recommendations. 
bf. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
Training requirements are obtained from personnel aptitudes, needs, readiness criteria and plans. 
Shore-based training activities support at-sea training in engagement of threats. The training 
objective is to develop skills and teamwork among organic and non-organic assets. Enroute to 
the objective area, training exercises complement pre-sail training of organic assets. 
bg. UNITBDA 
Battle damage assessment is the timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the 
application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle 
damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, 
ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. 
Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage 
assessment, and target system assessment [39]. 
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bh. UNITSOP 
The Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) is a set of instructions established by a tactical unit 
covering those operations which lend themselves to a standardized process without loss of 
effectiveness. This SOP is applicable unless otherwise ordered. 
bi. WARNING AND WEAPON STATUS 
The warning (white, yellow, red) and weapon status (tight, free, safe) establishes the readiness 
level of the battle group [4]. The OTC/CWC and the AAWC selects the appropriate defensive 
posture based on the warning and weapons status. The defensive posture requires positioning of 
force and the desired warning and weapons status. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
"Today, the nation's existing TBM defense capability rests with the PATRIOT system and 
its evolving improvements."[40] In the numerous exciting reports of ongoing TBMD 
development, it is easy for the seagoing operator to become deceived by the whirl of programs 
and budgets, COEA studies, R&D pilot ventures, operational test and evaluation, battlegroup 
workups, "future studies," and wargaming simulation. Thick briefing books and lengthy slide 
presentations show a plethora of systems in advanced stages of development, either being tested 
or awaiting further funding. Th,ere is, however, only one Active Defense weapon ready to go to 
war now, and that is PATRIOT (MIM-104). 
If funding levels remain constant over the next several years the Navy Area Defense 
(NAD) will put to sea at the turn of the century. NAD is one of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization's core systems, and thus (along with PATRIOT PAC-3 and THAAD) has a great 
deal of developmental and bureaucratic momentum. The SM2 Block IV A is the latest version in 
a series of surface-to-air missiles that will give the AEGIS system the capability to engage 
conventional AA W targets as well as TBMs. The increased capability of the SM2 Block IV A, 
combined with the software changes enhancing the SPY-1 radar, give NAD a much larger 
defended area than PATRIOT PAC-3, thus developing an intermediate step in the DOD's multi-
tiered approach to TBMD. The development of the NAD architecture will further assist in the 




If a regional contingency involving a TBM-armed, Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
capable adversary were to erupt tomorrow there is currently one active defense system that could 
be employed to defend against potential attack, the PATRIOT MIM-104. However, potential 
enemies have the ability to create a weapon that can outperform the PATRIOT, thus prompting 
the creation of advanced systems such as: 
1. Navy Area Defense (NAD) 
2. Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTW) 
3. Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) 
4. PAC-3 Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT). 
The Navy's new systems are being developed from existing technologies and platforms, and the 
funding has already been allocated for those follow-on systems. In order for the Navy to achieve 
its goal of fielding the Navy Area Defense (NAD) system, changes have to be made to current 
equipment, operational tactics, and planning. Steps must be taken to ensure an effective 
migration of the "as is" systems and tactics to the "to be" versions. After comparing the physical 
architectures and the information architectures, in addition to interviews with current AA W 
subject matter experts, it became eyident that there are areas of potential problems with the 
transition. Many solutions to these problems are included in a current system 
upgrade/improvements and in the development of a new system. Some of these solutions may be 
wishful thinking due to budget contrainsts. This thesis has explored all of the potential problems 




a. In accordance with the Navy Wide OPT ASK TBMD the Aegis ships need the ability 
to shift from TBMD search mode to area air defense mode, and vice versa, in a timely manner. 
When stationing Aegis platforms employing NTDCP in a TBMD role, a second air defense 
capable ship should be placed in a shotgun position to provide for ar~a air defense. 
b. Scheduled maintenance must be accomplished on the Aegis Weapon System. Much 
of this scheduled maintenance requires system shutdown, therefore a schedule must be developed 
that allows for system maintenance while maintaining coverage of the defended area. System 
developers must be sensitive to the constraints that maintenance imposes on mission 
performance. 
c. The ability to re-arm Vertical Launch Systems at-sea in severe environmental 
conditions is a desirable feature to provide operational flexibility and sustainability. Also, rapid 
adjustment to a dynamic threat environment is a valuable operational attribute. An example is a 
surface ship outloaded for patrol with the most likely needed missile and payload mix for its 
mission. However, a changing threat or new mission requirements could require a change of 
missile and payload mix, and a capability for at-sea reconfiguration or changeout is needed. 
The essentials of the problem are that no shipboard mechanisms exist today capable of 
replenishing either Tomahawk missiles or the SM-2 Block IV and Block IVA missiles (under 
development) aboard AEGIS ships (CGs and DDGs) under at-sea forward-deployed conditions. 
Any current shipboard mechanisms which do perform a missile replenishment function can do so 
only in gentle sea conditions ( < sea state 3) and in temperate climates. Further, any future 
Tomahawk or SM-2 Block IV missile replenishment operation can receive no assistance from the 
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existing crane system on board AEGIS ships because the weight of either missile in its canister 
exceeds the crane's loading capacity. 
Unless a new underway replenishment system is provided, such replenishments will 
require that the ship go to a friendly port which has the appropriate crane systems to handle such 
weapons safely. The retirement of all AD36 and AD41 class destroyer tenders by the end of 
1996 removes the only other existing option for such replenishment.[41] 
2. Operations 
a. When is a track considered "Hostile" for the purposes of identification and weapons 
release? 
b. How will the TBMD commander decide which TBMD asset will fire at the incoming 
threat? 
c. What is the most efficient way to assign assets to targets? 
d. Does the individual asset commander decide whether to shoot or not? 
e. What role does the Defended Asset List play in the assignment of priorities to an 
inbound threat? 
f. Because of the probable firing doctrine (i.e., shoot-shoot-look-shoot) many 
engagement assets could potentially be wasted due to redundant assignments. 
g. There is a need for development of new data link symbology for TBMD. There is 
currently a symbol for a TBM, but is there going to be a symbol for an unknown assumed hostile 
ballistic missile? Will the symbology change between the different states? 
h. An accurate display of the predicted impact point and the surrounding area of 
uncertainty will be vital in the weapons release decision. As demonstrated in the Roving Sands 
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95 exercise, if all available TBMD assets engage an incoming target there is a high probability of 
kill. However, the amount of TBMD weapons expended would not allow for a sustained 
presence without immediate rearming. Assigning a single TBMD asset a geographical area to 
defend conserved the number of weapons used in the engagements, but allowed many of the 
incoming weapons to reach their targets. A combination of the two must be used to defend the 
friendly assets effectively as well as conserve TBMD weapons for sustained operations. 
One method of accomplishing this goal is to prioritize the items on the defended assets 
list and assign more than one TBMD asset to each item. The prioritization will determine if 
more than one TBMD asset will engage a single incoming threat. For example, if the defended 
asset was a nuclear power plant all of the TBMD assets would engage the incoming missile if 
possible. If the item on the DAL is not a high priority then fewer numbers of TBMD assets 
would engage the TBMs. This prioritization would allow for the most efficient and effective 
protection possible. 
3. Planningffraining 
a. What are the criteria for kill assessment and the requirement for launch of backup 
engagement assets? 
b. We need the ability to link with civilian air control agencies, starting with our own 
FAA. 
c. We need additional training in joint capabilities and limitations. 
d. New Aegis Combat Training System(ACTS) scenarios must be developed to train 
watch sections for this new mission. The scenarios should also be used to test newly developed 
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tactics for enhanced protection of assets assigned to the TBMD commander in addition to those 
placed under his protection on the Defended Asset List (DAL). 
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The following definitions describe the IDEF Model for "perform AAW." This model was 
completed by NRaD, Code 4121 for the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. The functions 
described in the following definitions and IDEFO diagrams were used as the "as is" or baseline 
model for the creation of the "perform TBMD operations" model. The concepts described in 
Chapter IV were derived by examining both models simultaneously and analyzing the 
differences. 
Definitions 
Activity Name: Assess Battle Damage & Kill 
Activity Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO assess the battle damage to own forces and 
kill results of engagements of enemy air platforms and missiles. The battle damage and kill 
assessment report is relayed to the Battle Group Commander through secure radio via the 
Situational Report. This information is also used to maintain the tactical situational awareness, 
to assess friendly/enemy expectation of capability and to develop the AA W Plan. 
Activity Number: 214 
Activity Name: Assess Friendly/Enemy Expectation of Capability 
Activity Definition: Assessment of enemy expectation of capability is an evaluation of the threat 
and the perceived threat's intentions of the day. Assessment of friendly capability is an 
evaluation of own forces and how well they can perform against the threat's intentions. The 
accuracy of the assessment is crucial to the overall performance of the AA W mission and is 
based on the accuracy of intelligence and other information. Assessment includes friendly and 
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enemy order of battle, demonstrated proficiency, training level, pattern of operation, and 
indicators and warnings. 
Activity Number: 11 
Activity Name: Coordinate/ Control Assets & Report Results 
Activity Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO assess the tactical situational and executes 
command and control over AA W forces to perform all aspects of the AA W mission. This 
includes the required command and control actions and force orders for the force assets (F-14, F-
18 and AA W missile systems) to engage targets with hard kill weapons. Force orders are defined 
as one of the following: Weapons Free- Fire may be opened on any target(s) that has (have) not 
been identified as FRIEND. Weapons Safe- Do not open fire/cease firing. Fire may be opened 
only in self defense or in response to a formal order. Weapons Tight- Do not open fire unless 
target(s) has (have) been identified as HOSTILE. Cease Fire- Do not open fire or discontinue 
firing; complete intercept if missile is in flight; continue to track. Hold Fire - This order directs 
units to withhold or cease fire on the designated track. Guidance for semiactive missiles which 
are already in flight should be discontinued. Hold Fire is an emergency order that temporarily 
terminates a particular engagement or restricts firing in a particular airspace. A Hold Fire order 
applies to a specific aircraft, missile unit, sector, altitude, or corridor, and should not be given for 
an entire AA W system. Report of results of force orders execution is performed through secure 
radio reports between the AA WC and the BG Commander followed up with SITREP. (Reference 
f: NWP 32, ANTIAIR WARFARE (U)) 
Activity Number: 223 
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Activity Name: Detect Radar Track 
Activity Definition: Radar operators on board naval combatant ships and aircraft utilize sensor 
data and the battle damage kill assessment reports to detect, establish, display, and maintain radar 
tracks. The output of this function is radar data . 
Activity Number: 2111 
Activity Name: Develop AA W Plan 
Activity Definition: The AA W Plan is promulgated as the OPT ASK AA W Supplements and the 
Daily Intentions Message and are the results of a coordinated effort between the AA W Staff, the 
Battle Group Staff and the Air Wing Staff. The Navy Wide Standing OPT ASK AA W is used as a 
guide for development of the OPT ASK AA W Supplements. OPT ASK AA W Supplements are 
issued periodically based on any major changes to the tactical situational. The Operations Orders 
(OPORD) and, if the Battle Group (BG) is part of a Joint Task Force (JTF), the Joint Air Defense 
Plan (JADP) provide guidance that are reflected in the supplement. Information is also obtained 
from component coordination for assets availability and INTEL. The Daily Intentions Message 
contain the details of the day-to-day AA W asset apportionment to include numbers, types, 
positioning, time on station, and assignments of aircraft and AA W missile ships. The Daily 
Intentions Message also addresses changes to elements such as task organization, AA W 
procedures, joining procedures, EMCON, surveillance requirements, tanking procedures, 
communication suite, ID procedures, data links procedures, constraints to the operating 
environment, commercial air routes, VFR flight activities, geographical and meteorological 
information, assessment of the friendly and enemy expectation of capability, threat anticipated 
actions, intercept and escort policies, engagement tactics, target weaponeering, air-to-air 
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refueling, minimum risk routing (MRR) procedures, codes of authentication procedures, and 
divert landing locations. There may be occasions when the AA WC is assigned the responsibility 
for development of the LINK Plan which then becomes incorporated as part of the AA W Plan 
and promulgated as the OPT ASK LINK Supplements. The OPT ASK LINK Supplements 
contains the details of the day-to-day LINK assets apportionment such as track number 
assignment, link numbers assigned to participating units, assignment of track number blocks used 
for reporting, as well as instructions for changing frequencies and link reporting requirements. 
The AAWC may provide inputs to guidance and the ATO as far as Rules Of Engagements (ROE) 
are concerned. The execution of the ROE may reveal more effective approach to the ROE which 
could be either relaxation or increase of the rules. The request for changes of the ROE is in a 
message form called "Request for ROE Changes". When the changes to the ROE has been 
approved they becomes incorporated in the AA W Plan and reflected in the OPT ASK AA W 
Supplement and the Daily Intentions Message. 
Activity Number: 13 
Activity Name: Engage w/ Hard Kill Weapons 
Activity Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO provide force orders to F-14 (Phoenix, 
Sidewinder, Sparrow, and guns), F-18 (Sparrow, Sidewinder, AMRAAM, and guns) and SAM-
capable ships (SM-1 and SM-2) against air targets. Results of engagement are provided to the 
AA WC and the force TAO. 
Activity Number: 224 
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Activity Name: Establish AAW Situation Awareness 
Activity Definition: The overall purpose of this function is to establish and maintain the real time 
AA W tactical situational awareness. This includes the functions to establish the battle space 
track data, identify (ID) the tracks, establish threat priority and assess battle damage and kill. 
The tactical situational awareness provides the AA WC and the force Tactical Action Officer 
(TAO) the required real time information for execution of the overall command and control of 
the AA W defensive force. 
Activity Number: 21 
Activity Name: Establish Battle Space Track Data 
Activity Definition: This function establishes and maintains the battle space track data. Radar 
operators on board naval combatant ships and aircraft detect, establish, and maintain track data. 
Component track supervisors support the force track supervisor to manage and maintain the 
overall battle space track data. Sensor data and battle damage kill assessment reports are 
correlated to maintain the real time battle space track data. 
Activ~ty Number: 211 
Activity Name: Establish Link Data 
Activity Definition: Component track supervisors, component track coordinators, force track 
supervisor and force track coordinator utilizes the tactical data links to share radar data in 
accordance to link procedures established in the OPT ASK AA W Supplements and the OPT ASK 
LINK Supplements. Radar data are shared via Link-11 and Link-16 among combatant ships, E-2 
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aircraft, AOC, AWCAS, Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), etc. Link-4A target data is 
used for combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft. 
Activity Number: 2112 
Activity Name: Establish Threat Priorities 
Activity Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO establish threat priorities based on the threat 
potential and prioritize them for engagement. The AA W target prioritization is an assessment of 
evaluated track data, INTEL, battle damage/kill assessment report, sensor data, environmental 
data, own asset status, operations feedback, OPT ASK AA W, Daily Intentions Message, and 
guidance, especially the rules of engagement (ROE). Threat assessment includes the following 
considerations: 1. The most immediate, time critical threat. 2. Nature of the threat: anti ship 
missile (ASM) platforms, strike support aircraft (EC). targeting, strike coordination, tactical 
strike aircraft, or ASMs in flight. 3. Range of threat: within or beyond maximum ASM launch 
range. 4. Threat composition: single or multiple targets, stepped or broad front formations. 5. 
Own-force engagement capability. Although threat detection, identification, and assessment 
normally occur after the battle is jqined, the AA WC establishes threat prioritization criteria well 
in advance of the battle. He ensures that the guidance provided can be executed by the unit 
commanders in engaged ships and aircraft during the heat of battle and during periods of 
degraded communications. His guidance therefore is simple, clear, and flexible. (Reference a: 
NWP 10-1-21 (Rev. A) ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMANDER'S MANUAL) 
Activity Number: 213 
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Activity Name: Establish Threat Sector/ Intercept & Escort Policies 
Activity Definition: Based on the assessment performed on the AA W friendly and enemy 
expectation of capability, and INTEL (to include political considerations) and with the ewe 
guidance, AA We determines the probable threat sectors, and defines the extent of the AA W 
battle space. Threat sectors are defined as the most probable areas that an attack may come from. 
Intercept and escort policies define the range for intercept to occur and the escort policies to be 
followed after intercept. 
Activity Number: 12 
Activity Name: Execute AA W Actions 
Activity Definition: The AA we and the force TAO execute command and control with force 
orders to engage with hard kill weapons. The AA W operations are against enemy air (Blue Air 
versus Red Air) based on OPT ASK AA W Supplement, Daily Intentions Message, Guidance, 
ATO, position of assets, targeting data, sensor data and results of engagement. Prior to execution 
of force orders, the engagement posture is selected and assets are positioned for engagement. 
Activity Number: 22 
Activity Name: Execute AA W Operations 
Activity Definition: Execute AA W Mission establishes the AA W environment and executes 
AA W actions. The AA W operations are against enemy air units, i.e., Blue Air versus Red Air. 
The function to establish the AA W environment supports the execution of AA W actions by 
providing real time tactical situational awareness. Execute AA W actions performs the necessary 
force activities required to counter any AA W threat. This includes the required command and 
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control actions and force orders for execution of force assets (F-14, F-18 and missile systems) to 
engage target with hard kill weapons. The main output of this function are the results of 
engagement such as negated missiles and defended sectors. 
Activity Number: 2 
Activity Name: I.D. Track Data 
Activity Definition: Once track data has been detected and acquired, it is evaluated and identified 
as a friend, foe or unknown and what type of weapons platform it is. For the "unknown contacts, 
i.e., non cooperative target recognition compliant" information such as altitude, speed, and flight 
pattern are correlated with friendly flight plans, friendly flight corridors, commercial air routes, 
MRR procedures, and any other information available for positive identification. Should all of 
these methods fail to produce positive identification, the track is designated as unknown. Within 
the process of air defense the most critical process is the detection and identification of contact 
track data and must be rapidly accomplished at a reasonable range to allow some flexibility in the 
engagement process. Effective measures designed to provide timely identification include 
positive radar control, visual control, flight plans, IFF, and air corridors. A detailed discussion of 
these measures is found in NWP 32. (Reference f: NWP 32, ANTIAIR WARFARE (U)) 
Activity Number: 212 
Activity Name: Integrate AAW Plan w/ C2W Plan 
Activity Definition: The integration of the AA W Plan with the C2W Plan is a coordination 
process of specific issues which may affect the AA W or the C2W mission. Those issues are 
resolved prior to promulgation of either the AA W Plan or the C2W Plan. Coordination is 
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performed between the AAWC at the cruiser and the Battle Group Staff and the C2 Warfare 
Team on the carrier. An example of a C2W and AA W coordination issue is to minimize the 
potential for EW interference with own force AAM/SAM targeting. 
Activity Number: 14 
Activity Name: Manage Track Data 
Activity Definition: The force track coordinator manages, maintains, and coordinates the up-to-
date battle space track data with the use of the tactical data links. This assures that the battle 
space track data has no dual, gridlock, correct participating assignments, correct track block, 
correct frequency, and that the data is coherent. 
Activity Number: 2113 
Activity Name: Perform AA W Operations 
Activity Definition: Perform Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Operations is a model that presents AAW 
operations from the perspective (or "viewpoint") of the AA W Commander (AA WC/ A W) and the 
organic (Carrier Battle Group) and non-organic (Joint Force not assigned to the Carrier Battle 
Group) assets that contribute to the AA W defensive mission. The mission of the AA WC is to 
defend the force against air attacks such as Theater Missile Defense (TMD), cruise missiles (sea 
and land based), manned aircraft, and air to surface missiles (ASM). To exercise this mission, 
the AA WC plans the antiair warfare (AA W) battle, gives the warfighters simple directions that 
can be executed during all phases of the battle, and provides assistance to them in the 
performance of their missions. In any major conflict, U.S. naval forces will probably be 
employed at a battle force or battle fleet level. In this situation, the force/fleet commander's staff 
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conducts the required planning, effects the necessary liaison, allocates assets, and establishes the 
AA W mission, doctrine, policies, and plans to be executed by the individual battle groups. 
Battle Group (BG) Commanders repromulgate as necessary, and carry out assigned tasks in 
accordance with preplanned procedures that have been tailored to the particular situations. For 
small scale, low-intensity, or Third World tactical situations, planing and coordination may be 
relegated to the BG level, thus requiring the BG Commander/ AA WC to create the BG AA W 
plan for the specific situation. AAWC Command Relationship: The Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC) is responsible for defense of the battle group, but may delegate functions 
pertaining to antiair warfare (AA W) to the AA WC. The AA WC is subordinate to the CWC and 
is responsible to him for protecting the force against hostile air platforms and airborne weapons. 
The CWC retains ultimate control with command override, sometimes referred to as "command 
by negation". In some situations, the AA WC may delegate authority to sector antiair warfare 
commanders (SAA WCs) or local antiair warfare coordinators (LAA WCs). The AA WC retains 
control over his subordinates by monitoring their actions and exercising command override. The 
SAA WCs report to the AA WC. LAA WCs report to their respective SAA WCs, if established, 
and otherwise, to the AAWC. (Reference a: NWP 10-1-21 (Rev. A) ANTIAIR WARFARE 
COMMANDER'S MANUAL.) 
Activity Number: 0 
Activity Name: Plan AA W Operations 
Activity Definition: The products of Plan AA W Operations are the OPT ASK AA W Supplement 
and its modifier the Daily Intentions Message. Those messages are generated by the AA WC with 
inputs from the senior officers onboard the cruiser which may include the Commanding Officer 
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(CO), Executive Officer (XO), Operations Officer (OPS), Combat Information Center Officer 
(CICO), Signal Security Officer (SSO), as well as the Battle Group Staff and approved by the 
CWC. The AA WC uses the Navy Wide Standing OPT ASK AA W as a guide for generating the 
OPT ASK AA W Supplements. The OPT ASK AA W Supplements are complemented and 
modified by the Daily Intentions Message that contain the details of ~ay-to-day operations. 
Those messages addresses critical elements applicable to the specific mission such as the 
constraints of the operating environment to include commercial air routes, VFR flight activities, 
geographical and meteorological information, assessment of the friendly and enemy expectation 
of capability, friendly intelligence capability, the Chain-of-Command, engagement tactics, AAW 
disposition planning, surveillance requirements, coordination with the EW Plan, and 
communications. The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) may assign the function to 
promulgate the OPT ASK LINK Supplements from the Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
Commander to the AA WC. In this circumstance the AA W Plan includes the LINK Plan. The 
OPT ASK LINK Supplement contains the details of the day-to-day LINK assets apportionment 
such as track number assignment, link numbers assigned to participating units, assignment of 
track number blocks used for reporting, as well as instructions for changing frequencies and link 
reporting requirements. Those messages are promulgated in accordance with APP 4, Volume I, 
Allied Maritime Structured Message (U) and APP 4, Volume II, Allied Maritime Formatted 
Messages (U) (Reference b and c). The AA WC may provide inputs to guidance and the ATO as 
far as Rules Of Engagements (ROE) are concerned. The execution of the ROE may reveal more 
effective approaches to the ROE which could be either relaxing or tightening of the rules. The 
request for changes of the ROE is in a message form called "Request for ROE Changes". When 
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the changes to the ROE has been approved they becomes incorporated in the AA W Plan and 
reflected in the OPT ASK AA W Supplement and the Daily Intentions Message. 
Activity Number: 1 
Activity Name: Position/ Reposition Engagement Assets 
Activity Definition: Position I Reposition Initial Engagement Assets are the execution of the 
force initial positioning orders and the repositioning orders. 
Activity Number: 222 
Activity Name: Promulgate AA W Plan 
Activity Definition: The AA W Plan is promulgated as the OPT ASK AA W Supplements, the 
OPT ASK LINK Supplements, and the Daily Intentions Messages. Those messages are 
promulgated by the AAWC with inputs from the senior officers onboard the cruiser which may 
include the Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Operations Officer (OPS), 
Combat Information Center Officer (CICO), Signal Security Officer (SSO), approved by the 
ewe. 
Activity Number: 15 
Activity Name: Select Engagement Posture 
Activity Definition: Select Engagement Posture is a selection of the appropriate defensive 
posture performed by the OTC/CWC and the AA WC based on an ongoing assessment of the 
tactical AA W picture. The outcomes of this function are the Force Position Orders and the 
W amings and Weapons Status. Attendant to the determination of AA W areas and zones is the 
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selection of a suitable force disposition for AAW. Judicious disposition planning for AAW 
allows sufficient flexibility to enable the forces to counter other potential threats. The AA W 
formation, disposition, and stationing factors are discussed in NWP 32, Anti air Warfare (U), 
ATP 31, NATO Above Water Warfare Manual (U), and ATP 1, Volume I, Allied Maritime 
Tactical Instructions and Procedures (U). Figure 5-3 (U) Naval Surface-to Air Missile Systems is 
confidential and has the list of missiles/capabilities/platforms. (Reference a: NWP 10-1-21 (Rev. 
A) ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMANDER'S MANUAL) 
Activity Number: 221 
Arrow Name: *OPT ASK LINK Supplements 
Arrow Definition: The OPT ASK LINK Supplements message may be promulgated by the 
Command and Control Warfare Commander (C2WC). Information contained in the OPT ASK 
LINK Supplements include link reporting requirements, track number assignment, link numbers 
assigned to participating units, assignment of track number blocks used for reporting, instructions 
for changing frequencies, etc. 
Arrow Name: AA W Plan 
Arrow Definition: The AA W Plan is the AA WC plans and directions for the execution of the 
AA W missions. The AA W Plan is ·promulgated as the OPT ASK AA W Supplements Message 
and the Daily Intentions Message and may also include the OPT ASK LINK Supplements. 
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Arrow Name: AA W Staff 
Arrow Definition: The following are the billets to perform AA W operations and they may be 
referred to as the AA W Staff: Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Anti-Air 
Warfare Commander (AAWC), Operations Officer (OPS), Combat Information Center Officer 
(CICO) and Signal Security Officer (SSO). 
Arrow Name: AA W Staff, Battle Group Staff & Air Wing Staff 
Arrow Definition: The following are the billets to perform AA W operations, and they may be 
referred to as the AA W Staff: Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Anti-Air 
Warfare Commander (AAWC), Operations Officer (OPS), Combat Information Center Officer 
(CICO) and Signal Security Officer (SSO). Other billets used to perform AA W operations are 
the Battle Group Staff and the Air Wing Staff. The Battle Group Staff is comprised of the Battle 
Group Commander, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer, INTEL Officer, and C2W Officer. The 
Air Wing Staff is comprised of the Commander of the Air Group (CAG), Deputy CAG, CAG 
Operations, E-2 representative, and the Fighter representative. 
Arrow Name: AA WC +Battle Group Staff 
Arrow Definition: Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) and the Battle Group Staff. 
Arrow Name: ACO 
Arrow Definition: The Airspace Control Order (ACO) is developed and modified by the 
Airspace Control Authority (ACA). The responsibilities of the ACA and the AADC are 
interrelated. In a maritime environment these responsibilities will normally be assigned to the 
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JFACC (Afloat) who may delegate responsibility to the AAWC and the CV Air Operations 
Officer. The ACOs are published daily in the A TO/SPINS message and provide a means for 
higher commands to provide specific, detailed orders to subordinate units to effect airspace 
management. The ACO also notifies all pertinent agencies of the effective time of activation and 
the composite structure of the airspace to be used. The ACO can define and establish special 
purpose airspace for military operations, including air routes, base defense zones, coordinating 
measures/lines, drop zones, pickup points, restricted areas, etc. The ACO provides for a 
coordinated, deconflicted, integrated, and flexible use of airspace, with the airspace control 
system of host nations. If the Battle Group is not part of a Joint Task Force and consequently 
there is no ATO, the information provided for in the ACO will be found in the OPT ASK AA W 
Supplement and/or the Daily Intentions Message. 
Arrow Name: ADP 
Arrow Definition: The Air Defense Plan (ADP) is developed and modified by the Area Air 
Defense Commander. The responsibilities of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and the 
AADC are interrelated. In a marit~me environment these responsibilities will normally be 
assigned to the JFACC (Afloat) who may delegate responsibility to the AAWC and the CV Air 
Operations Officer. The ADP establishes area air defense responsibilities, provides as 
organization structure, sets alert requirements, and establishes Minimum Risk Routing (MRR). 
Arrow Name: ADS and Sensors 
Arrow Definition: Air Display System (ADS) and Sensors. 
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Arrow Name: ADS, Link 11, 16, 4A, LMS 11, voice 
Arrow Definition: Air Display System (ADS), Link 11, 16, 4A, LMS 11 and voice. 
Arrow Name: Assessment 
Arrow Definition: Assessment is an assessment of the friendly and enemy expectation of 
capability. Assessment of enemy capability is an evaluation of the threat and the perceived 
threat's intentions for the day. Assessment of friendly capability is an evaluation of own forces 
and how well they can perform against the threat's intentions. The accuracy of the assessment is 
crucial to the overall performance of the AA W mission and is based on the accuracy of 
intelligence and other information. 
Arrow Name: ATO 
Arrow Definition: The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) directs the employment 
of air forces and interdiction capable missiles assigned to the Joint Force Commander (JFC). 
The Air Tasking Order (ATO) message is issued daily by the JFACC to direct the actions of the 
different wings in the theater of operations. The ATO directs all planned air activities of the day. 
Missions are identified by wing and include mission number, name, and number/type of aircraft, 
time on target (TOT), and altitude. The ATO also contains the Direct Support Sortie that 
specifies tanking, EW and INTEL (photo/reconnaissance) flights to be performed. The ATO is 
written in an abbreviated format to condense the size of the printed document for faster 
photocopying and electronic transmission. (Everything that flies will be in the ATO.) 
Information that does not easily fit into the formatted portion of the ATO, yet necessary for the 
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complete understanding of the missions to be flown, is included in a free text portion of the ATO 
called the Special Instructions (SPINS). This method is used to provide units with a wide range 
of information from communications to tanker missions. The AA WC provides inputs to the 
ATO via the OPT ASK AA W Supplements, Daily Intentions Message and SITREP. 
Arrow Name: AW & Force TAO 
Arrow Definition: The Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC or AW) and the Force Tactical 
Air Operation Officer. 
Arrow Name: A W, Pilots, INTEL, Force & Component: TAO, Track Coord, I.D. & ESM 
Operators 
Arrow Definition: The Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC or AW), Pilots, INTEL personnel, 
Force and Component personnel such as: Tactical Air Operation Officer, Track Coordinator, I.D. 
& ESM Operators. 
Arrow Name: Battle Damage KA Reports 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO assess the battle damage to own forces and 
kill results of engagements of enemy air platforms and missiles. The battle damage and kill 
assessment report is relayed to the Battle Group Commander through secure radio as part of the 
Situation Report (SITREP). This information is also used to maintain the tactical situation 
awareness, assess friendly/enemy expectation of capability and develop the AA W Plan. 
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Arrow Name: Battle Space Track Data 
Arrow Definition: Radar operators on board naval combatant ships and aircraft detect, establish, 
and maintain track data. Component track supervisors support the force track supervisor to 
manage and maintain the overall battle space track data. Sensor data and battle damage kill 
assessment report are correlated to maintain the real time battle space track data. Battle Space 
Track Data has the following components: time, x, y, z, heading and speed. 
Arrow Name: Billets 
Arrow Definition: Billets are the required personnel to perform the function. The following are 
the billets to perform AA W operations and they may be referred to as the AA W Staff: 
Commanding Officer (CO), Executive Officer (XO), Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC), 
Operations Officer (OPS), Combat Information Center Officer (CICO) and Signal Security 
Officer (SSO). Other billets used to perform AA W operations are the Battle Group Staff and the 
Air Wing Staff. The Battle Group Staff is comprised of the Battle Group Commander, Chief of 
Staff, Operations Officer, INTEL Officer, and C2W Officer. The Air Wing Staff is comprised of 
the Commander of the Air Group (~AG), Deputy CAG, CAG Operations , E-2 representative, 
and the Fighter representative. 
Arrow N arne: C2 Architecture 
Arrow Definition: C2 architectures are defined as the established command and control structure. 
Updates to the C2 architectures are performed by the OPT ASK AA W Supplements and the Daily 
Intentions Messages. If the theater of operation has the JF ACC function, the ATO will provide 
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updates to the C2 architecture, and the AA WC incorporates those updates in the OPT ASK AA W 
Supplements and the Daily Intentions Messages. 
Arrow Name: Component Coordination AA W/C2W 
Arrow Definition: Component Coordination AAW/C2W is the Anti-Air Warfare Commander 
coordination with the Command and Control Warfare Command (C2WC), who coordinates 
electronic warfare in the force, and the command, control, and communications countermeasures. 
Arrow Name: Component Request 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC receives requests from various components for support of air 
operations. An example of component request would be from a FFG who may request control of 
a F-14 for two hours in order to maintain the qualifications of an air intercept controller. This 
does not occur often. However if the AA WC also is assigned as the AADC a request may come 
from a HAWK battery who is experiencing casualties and requests a 12 hour cover while 
performing repairs. Coordinated Issues: After the AA W and the EW plan have been integrated 
the issues that required coordination have been settled and integrated in the AAW Plan. The 
Daily Intentions Message is now ready for promulgation. 
Arrow Name: Coordinated Issues 
Arrow Definition: After the AA W and the EW plan have been integrated, the issues that required 
coordination have been settled and integrated in the AA W Plan. The Daily Intentions Message is 
now ready for promulgation. 
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Arrow Name: Coordination 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC interacts with other warfare commanders, services, and allied 
units and coordinators from planning through the engagement phase. The AA WC coordinates 
force AA W defense and works closely with the air element coordinator (AREC), who provides 
supporting aircraft; the Command and Control Warfare Command (C2WC), who coordinates 
electronic warfare in the force; and the command, control, and communications countermeasures. 
The AA WC coordinates in order to optimize the use of multimission-capable assets; avoid 
conflicting requirements for aircraft, deck space, and services in various situations; exchange 
information about the tactical situations; and guard against mutual interference between friendly 
units and inadvertent engagement of friendly units. Should unresolved conflicting requirements 
remain, the CWC is the final authority. (Reference a: NWP 10-1-21 (Rev. A) ANTIAIR 
WARFARE COMMANDER'S MANUAL. and modified at the 19 July 94- Naval Doctrine 
Command - meeting.) 
Arrow Name: Coordination Issues 
Arrow Definition: In the effort to integrate the AA W Plan with the EW Plan, specific issues 
which may affect the AA W or the EW mission require coordination. Coordination is performed 
between the AA WC on the cruiser and the Battle Group Staff and C2 Warfare Team on the 
carrier. Those issues are resolved prior to promulgation of either the AA W Plan or the EW Plan. 
The Battle Group Commander has the final decision on unresolved issues. An example of EW 
and AA W coordination issue is to identify the required coordination to minimize the potential for 
EW interference with own force AAM/SAM targeting. 
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Arrow Name: Daily Intentions Message 
Arrow Definition: This report is generated by the AA WC/CVBG and relates to the AA W 
Intentions for the next day. The Daily Intentions Message is a modifier to the OPT ASK AAW 
Supplement. The OPT ASK AA W Supplement and Daily Intentions Message are the major 
interconnection between the functions "Plan AA W Operation" and "Execute AA W Operations". 
The Daily Intentions Message contain the details of the day-to-day AAW asset apportionment to 
include numbers, types, positioning, time on station and assignments of aircraft and missile 
ships. The Daily Intentions Message also addresses changes to elements such as task 
organization, AA W procedures, joining procedures, EM CON, tanking procedures, 
communication suite, ID procedures, data links procedures, constraints to the operating 
environment, commercial air routes, VFR flight activities, geographical and meteorological 
information, assessment of the friendly and enemy expectation of capability, threat anticipated 
actions, intercept and escort policies, engagement tactics, target weaponeering, air-to-air 
refueling, minimum risk routing (MRR) procedures, codes of authentication procedures, and 
divert landing locations. 
Arrow Name: Environmental Data 
Arrow Definition: Environmental Data are received from shore and space activities and provides 
raw and processed environmental data. Environmental data is also available on board ship such 
as charts as well as reports from other force units, pilot reports and IREPS messages. The 
environmental considerations follows: Meteorological such as cloud cover, precipitation, 
visibility, daylight and darkness, inversion layers, ducting, refraction, severe weather, extreme 
temperatures, and wind/jet stream. Oceanographic such as water depth, physical ocean obstacles, 
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land mass chock points, and proximity to land mass. Geographicffopographic such as physical 
obstacles, limiting avenues of approach, potential cover for hostile forces, and potential cover for 
own forces. (Reference a: NWP 10-1-21 (Rev. A) ANTIAIR WARFARE COMMANDER'S 
MANUAL) 
Arrow Name: Evaluated Track Data 
Arrow Definition: Once track data has been detected and acquired, it is evaluated and identified 
as a friend or foe and what type of weapons platform it is. For the "unknown contacts, i.e., non 
cooperative target recognition compliant" information such as altitude, speed, flight pattern are 
correlated with friendly flight plans, friendly flight corridors, commercial air routes, RTF and 
MRR procedures, and any other information available for positive identification. Should all of 
these methods fail to produce positive identification, the track is designated as unknown. Within 
the process of air defense the most critical process is the detection and identification of contact 
track data and must be rapidly accomplished at a reasonable range to allow some flexibility in the 
engagement process. Effective measures designed to provide timely identification include 
positive radar control, visual control, flight plans, IFF, and air corridors. A detailed discussion of 
these measures is found in NWP 32, ANTIAIR WARFARE (U) 
Arrow Name: F-14 (Phoenix, Sidewinder, Sparrow, guns); F-18 (Sparrow, Sidewinder, 
AMRAAM, guns), missile systems (SM-1&2); voice, Tactical Data Link 
Arrow Definition: The weapons used by the F-14: Phoenix, Sidewinder, Sparrow, guns; the 
weapons used by the F-18 aircraft: Sparrow, Sidewinder, AMRAAM, guns and the shipboard 
Missile Systems: SM-1&2. Voice, and the Tactical Data Link. 
118 
Arrow Name: F-14, F-18, Missile System Operator 
Arrow Definition: The manning required to operate the F-14 and F-18 aircraft and the Missile 
System Operator. 
Arrow Name: Force & Component Track Coordinator and Track Sup 
Arrow Definition: Force Track Coordinator coordinates the tracks in the Force level. Component 
Track Coordinator coordinates the tracks in the component level. Track supervisor is called the 
Track Sup. 
Arrow Name: Force & Component Track Coordinator and Track Sup, Radar Operator 
Arrow Definition: Force Track Coordinator coordinates the tracks in the Force level. Component 
Track Coordinator coordinates the tracks in the component level. Track supervisor is called the 
Track Sup. Radar Operator operates the radars. 
Arrow Name: Force Orders 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO assess the tactical situation and execute 
command and control over AA W forces to perform all aspects of the AA W mission. This 
includes the required command and control actions and force orders for the force assets (F-14, F-
18 and missile systems) to engage targets with hard kill weapons. Force orders are defined as 
one of the following: Weapons Free- Fire may be opened on any target(s) that has (HAVE) not 
been identified as FRIEND. Weapons Safe- Do not open fire/cease firing. Fire may be opened 
only in self defense or in response to a formal order. Weapons Tight - Do not open fire unless 
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target(s) has (have) been identified as HOSTILE. Cease Fire- Do not open fire or discontinue 
firing; complete intercept if missile is in flight; continue to track. Hold Fire - This order directs 
units to withhold or cease fire on the designated track. Guidance for semiactive missiles which 
are already in flight should be discontinued. Hold Fire is an emergency order that temporarily 
terminates a particular engagement or restricts firing in a particular airspace. A Hold Fire order 
applies to a specific aircraft, missile unit, sector, altitude, or corridor, and should not be given for 
an entire AA W system. Report of results of force orders execution is performed through secure 
radio reports between the AA WC and the BG Commander followed up with SITREP. 
(Reference f: NWP 32, ANTIAIR WARFARE (U)) 
Arrow Name: Force TAO 
Arrow Definition: The Force level Tactical Air Operation (TAO) Officer. 
Arrow Name: Force Track Coordinator 
Arrow Definition: The Force level Track Coordinator. 
Arrow Name: Genser & SI Traffic, Voice 
Arrow Definition: Genser Traffic is the hard copy message traffic received at the radio room. 
Special Intelligence (SI) traffic is also hard copy messages from the radio room. Voice is voice 
communication. 
Arrow Name: Genser & SI Traffic, Voice, Charts 
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Arrow Definition: Genser Traffic is the hard copy message traffic received at the radio room. 
Special Intelligence (SI) traffic is also hard copy messages from the radio room. Voice is voice 
communication. Charts are the geographical charts used. 
Arrow Name: Genser & SI Traffic, Voice, Tactical Data Link, ADS 
Arrow Definition: Genser Traffic is hard copy radio message Special Intelligence (SI) Traffic is 
hard copy secure radio messages. Voice assets are the radios. Tactical Data Links are the 
NTCS-A, Link-11 and Link-16. ADS is the AEGIS Display System. 
Arrow Name: Genser & SI Traffic, Word Processor 
Arrow Definition: Genser Traffic is the hard copy message traffic received at the radio room. 
Special Intelligence (SI) traffic is also hard copy messages from the radio room. Word Processor 
is any available software that is used to generate a text document. 
Arrow Name: Guidance 
Arrow Definition: Guidance is provided to the Anti-Air Warfare Mission Area Commander by 
the Battle Group Commander, who in turn receives guidance from the Joint Force Commander 
(JFC). The guidance provided by the Battle Group Commander (physically located on the 
carrier) is a result of an interactive coordinated effort as the theater of operations matures. As the 
theater matures and becomes a sustained theater of operation, less guidance is required. This 
guidance may be called Warning Orders, Alert Orders, or Operations Orders (OPORD). This 
guidance follows a five-section format that contains Situation, Mission Statement, Execution, 
Administrative, and Command and Control information. The Situation describes the enemy and 
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the friendly situation of the theater. The Mission Statement defines what is the mission of the 
Anti-Air Warfare Mission Area Commander. Execution is the JFC-expected executions of the 
AAW orders performed by the Anti-Air Warfare Mission Area Commander. Administrative 
orders are the logistic orders to maintain the mission. Command and Control information 
includes an identification of the chain of command in the theater an~ the Rules of Engagement 
(ROE). The Anti-Air Warfare Commander (AAWC) and the Battle Group Commander (CVBG) 
provides to the JFC a Situation Report that relays the events of the operations (SITREP) at the 
end of each event and/or every 24 hours, a Daily Intentions Message, and the OPT ASK AA W 
Supplements. The JFC sends out the formal guidance as described above based on those inputs 
and coordinates between the components and warfare commanders such as the Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Commander (ASWC), the Anti-Surface Warfare Commander (ASUWC), and the 
Command Control Warfare Commander (CCWC). The AAWC (AW) reports via secured radio 
to the CVBG (AB) as required such as new contacts, changes to the tactical picture, changes to 
the CAP station, new targets, etc. The CVBG in turn reports the information as needed up the 
chain of command such as to Third Fleet or NA VFOR. Guidance is then provided via secure 
radio down the chain of command. In real time operations one must realize that the chain of 
command and control functions may vary and that the AA W is executing the AA W mission as 
needed unless negated. 
Arrow Name: In Position Assets 
Arrow Definition: In Position Assets are the result of AA W assets following the initial 
positioning orders or the repositioning orders. 
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Arrow Name: Initial Positioning Orders 
Arrow Definition: Engagement AA W assets initially position themselves as directed in the Daily 
Intentions Message following the AA W plan. 
Arrow Name: INTEL 
Arrow Definition: Onboard naval command ships there are Intelligence (INTEL) Centers that are 
responsible for receiving, processing, fusing, and distributing INTEL to appropriate warfare 
commanders. INTEL provides an estimate of the threat's capabilities and intentions. INTEL can 
be disseminated either by voice, data links, or hard copy messages. 
Arrow Name: INTEL to include Political Considerations 
Arrow Definition: Onboard naval command ships there are Intelligence (INTEL) Centers that are 
responsible for receiving, processing, fusing, and distributing INTEL to appropriate warfare 
commanders. INTEL provides an estimate of the threat's capabilities and intentions. INTEL can 
be disseminated either by voice, data links, or hard copy messages. This includes political 
considerations. 
Arrow Name: JAOP 
Arrow Definition: In conjunction with components, the JF ACC is responsible for developing the 
Joint Air Operation Plan (JAOP) which may include strategic air warfare, theater-wide AAW/air 
interdiction, maritime support, area air defense, airspace control, airborne reconnaissance and 
surveillance, and Combat Air Patrol (CAP). The JAOP will account for all tasked joint air 
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sorties to accomplish or support the JFC's objectives. The JAOP should be submitted early and 
remain dynamic for subordinate planning. The JAOP provides operational direction and tasks to 
subordinate forces for the execution of joint air tasking. The JAOP must address logistical 
constraints. The feasibility of joint air operations depends on a viable, sustainable concept of 
operations. The JAOP must also include provisions for the transition oftheJFACC between 
platforms or components afloat or ashore. The JAOP encompasses all facets of air and space 
operations to include strike, EW, and ECM. 
Arrow Name: Linked Data 
Arrow Definition: Force track supervisor, force track coordinator, component track supervisors 
and component track coordinators utilize the tactical data links to share radar data in accordance 
with link procedures established in the OPT ASK LINK Supplements. Radar data are shared via 
Link-11 and Link-16 among combatant ships, E-2 aircraft, AOC, AWCAS, Tactical Air 
Operations Center (TAOC), etc. Link-4A target data is used for combat air patrol (CAP) aircraft. 
Arrow Name: Operations Feedback 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO receive results of engagement, assess the 
AA W situation and report results to the CVBG by voice as operations feedback which is also 
incorporated in the SITREP. This information is also used to maintain the tactical situation 
awareness, establish threat priorities, assess friendly and enemy expectations of capability, and 
develop the AA W Plan. 
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Arrow Name: OPT ASK AA W Supplements 
Arrow Definition: This report is generated by the AA WC/CVBG and relates to the force the 
overall AA W plan. The OPT ASK AA W Supplement specifies the procedures, the 
predetermined responses, and the assets management for the AA W mission. 
COMSECONDFL T, COMTHIRDFL T, COMSIXTHFL T, and COMSEVENTHFL T promulgate 
the Navy-wide OPT ASK AA W that is the standing OPT ASK message. Prior to deployment the 
AA WC/CVBG releases a supplement to the OPT ASK specific for the Battle Group tailored to 
the available assets and missions. As the physical location of the Battle Group changes, 
supplements are revised as necessary. The OPT ASK AA W Supplement may be further modified 
by the Daily Intentions Message. 
Arrow Name: OPT ASK LINK Supplements 
Arrow Definition: The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) may assign the function to 
promulgate the OPT ASK LINK Supplements from the Command and Control Warfare (C2W) 
Commander to the AA WC. In this circumstance the AA W Plan includes the LINK Plan. The 
OPT ASK LINK Supplement cont~ins the details of the day-to-day LINK assets apportionment 
such as track number assignment, link numbers assigned to participating units, assignment of 
track number blocks used for reporting, as well as instructions for changing frequencies and link 
reporting requirements. 
Arrow Name: Organic & Non-Organic Assets 
Arrow Definition: Organic and non-organic assets are the required assets to perform the function. 
The following are the assets required to perform AA W operations: Radio, Genser traffic (hard 
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copy message from radio), Special Intelligence (SI) traffic (hard copy secure message from 
radio), Tactical Data Link (NTCS-A, Link-4A, Link-11, Link-16), AEGIS Display System 
(ADS), Link Management System (LMS), voice, charts, word processor, missiles (Phoenix, 
Sidewinder, Sparrow, Advance Medium Range Anti Air Missile (AMRAAM), SM-1 and SM-2), 
guns, and air search radars (SPY-1, SPS-49, SPS-48E, APS-138, APS-139, APS-145, APG-71, 
APG-65, AAS-38, AWG-9, APG-71, APY-2) 
Arrow Name: Own Assets Status (Real Time) 
Arrow Definition: Part of Tactical Situation Awareness is information concerning the real time 
status of own assets which may vary pending the unfolding of events. This information is used 
real time by the AA WC and the Force TAO in the execution of AA W actions. 
Arrow Name: Own Asset Status 
Arrow Definition: The OPSUM, CASREP and AMRR are reviewed and a summary is provided 
to the AA WC on the status of the assets allocated to him. The Operation Summary (OPSUM) is 
generated daily by each ship and relates to the CVBG the logistics and administrative situation. 
The Casualty Report (CASREP) message is transmitted by each unit when an equipment 
experiences a casualty. The CAS REP indicates how long the equipment is expected to be out, 
the nature of the equipment failure, and if parts or technical support is required to bring the 
system back on line. The Aircraft Material Readiness Report (AMRR) message is transmitted by 
the Air Wing Commander and contains information related to the material readiness of aircraft 
and any outstanding discrepancy. 
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Arrow Name: Radar Data 
Arrow Definition: Radar operators on board naval combatant ships and aircraft utilize sensor 
data and the battle damage kill assessment reports to detect, establish, display, and maintain radar 
tracks. The output of this function is radar data. 
Arrow Name: Radar Operators 
Arrow Definition: Radar operators are the personnel required to operate the radars. 
Arrow Name: Repositioning Orders 
Arrow Definition: The AA WC and the force TAO coordinate and control in real time AA W 
assets. As the tactical situation changes the AA WC and/or the force TAO will issue 
repositioning orders to component units. 
Arrow Name: Request for ROE Changes 
Arrow Definition: The AAWC may provide inputs to guidance and the ATO as far as Rules Of 
Engagements (ROE) are concerned. The execution of the ROE may reveal more effective 
approaches to the ROE which could be either relaxing or tightening of the rules. The request for 
changes of the ROE is in a message form called "Request for ROE Changes". When the changes 
to the ROE has been approved, they becomes incorporated in the AA W Plan and reflected in the 
OPT ASK AA W Supplement and the Daily Intentions Message. 
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Arrow Name: Results of Engagement w/ Hard Kill Weapons 
Arrow Definition: Engagement assets such as F-14s, F-18s, and SAM-capable ships report to the 
AA WC by voice the results of engagement with hard kill weapons. 
Arrow Name: ROE 
Arrow Definition: Roles of Engagement (ROE) are the rules to be followed when engagement is 
executed. The Commander in Chief (CINC) issues ROE messages that specify what, where and 
when for engagement to occur. Because of the political significance of ROE decisions, ROE 
may come from the national level. The ROE contain the criteria to decide what is a hostile 
Intentions and what is not a hostile Intentions, target identification, weapon control status, and 
the right to self defense. ROE are tailored to the physical location and as the Battle Group moves 
the specific CINC issues ROE messages for the region. There may be circumstances that the 
AA WC may request via message changes to the ROE. When the changes have been provided to 
the AA WC he promulgates then in the OPT ASK AA W Supplement and/or the Daily Intentions 
Message. 
Arrow N arne: Sensor Data 
Arrow Definition: Sensor Data is data obtained by organic and non-organic assets. Sensor data 
follows: ESM data, visual, processed radar data (different radars on different platforms), NCTR, 
SARTIS, etc. 
Arrow Name: SITREP 
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Arrow Definition: The AAWC (AW) reports via secure radio to the CVBG (AB) as required 
such as when there are changes to the tactical picture, changes to the CAP station, a new target, 
etc. SITREP includes information on threat, target identification data, battle damage kill 
assessment report, status of data link, weapon status and warning status. The format for the 
SITREP is contained in the OPT ASK AA W Supplements. The CVBG in turn reports the 
information as needed up the chain of command such as to Third Fleet or NA VFOR. 
Arrow Name: Tactical Data Links & Voice 
Arrow Definition: Tactical Data Link are the NTCS-A, Link-11, and Link-16. The voice data is 
the data obtained by voice. 
Arrow Name: Tactical Data Links, Air Search Radars, and Voice 
Arrow Definition: Tactical Data Links are the NTCS-A, Link-11, and Link-16. The airborne 
radars are APS 1251138/1391145, and APG 71. The voice data is the data obtained by voice. 
Arrow Name: Tactical Data Links, LMS-11 & Voice 
Arrow Definition: Tactical Data Link are the NTCS-A, Link-11, and Link-16. LMS-11 and the 
voice data is the data obtained by voice. 
Arrow Name: Tactical Situation Awareness 
Arrow Definition: The tactical situation awareness provides the AA WC and the force Tactical 
Action Officer (TAO) the required real time information for execution of the overall command 
and control of AA W defensive force. This includes identified track information, threat priority, 
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and assessment of battle damage and kill. Tactical situation awareness is the "who, what, where" 
real time tactical picture of friendly and enemy forces. 
Arrow Name: Targeting Data 
Arrow Definition: Targeting data includes target identification information, target description 
and criticality, target vulnerability, aim point, munitions effectiveness against target, and restrike 
recommendations. INTEL is a major source of targeting data. 
Arrow Name: Threat Sector/Intercept & Escort Policies 
Arrow Definition: Based on the assessment performed on the AA W friendly and enemy 
expectation of capability, and INTEL (to include political considerations), and with the ewe 
guidance, AA WC determines the probable threat sectors and defines the extent of the AA W 
battle space. Threat sectors are defined as the most probable areas that an attack may come from. 
Intercept and escort policies define the range for intercept to occur and the escort policies to be 
followed after intercept. 
Arrow Name: Voice, Tactical Data Link, ADS 
Arrow Definition: Voice assets are the radios. Tactical Data Link are the NTeS-A, Link-11, and 
Link-16. ADS is the AEGIS Display System. 
Arrow Name: Warnings & Weapons Status 
Arrow Definition: The OTetewe and the AA We selects the appropriate ·defensive posture 




positioning of forces and the desired warning and weapons status. The warning (white, yellow, 
and red) and weapon status (tight, free, safe) establish the readiness level of the battle group. 
Arrow Name: Watch Station 
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